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ABSTRACT
Though international criminal justice has flourished over the last
two decades, scholars have neglected institutional design and
procedure questions. International-criminal-procedure scholarship
has developed in isolation from its domestic counterpart but could
learn much realism from it. Given its current focus on atrocities like
genocide, international criminal law’s main purpose should be not
only to inflict retribution but also to restore wounded communities by
bringing the truth to light. The international justice system needs more
ideological balance, stable career paths, and civil-service expertise. It
should also draw on the American experience of federalism to
cultivate cooperation with national authorities and select fewer cases
for international prosecution. Revised plea bargaining and sentencing
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rules could learn from American experience and pitfalls, husbanding
scarce resources and minimizing haggling, yet still buying needed
cooperation. Finally, in blending adversarial and inquisitorial
systems, international criminal justice has jettisoned too many
safeguards of either one. It should reform discovery, speedy-trial
rules, witness preparation, cross-examination, and victims’ rights in
light of domestic experience. Just as international criminal law can
benefit from domestic realism, domestic law could incorporate more
international idealism and accountability, creating healthy political
pressures to discipline and publicize enforcement decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
After the world had spent years and millions bringing him to
court for genocide and war crimes, Slobodan Milošević cheated
justice. The butcher of the Balkans died unexpectedly in his holding
cell in 2006, as his four-year trial was drawing to a close but before
verdict and sentence. Proceedings were slow and costly; as of
Milošević’s death, hundreds of people had been charged but only
dozens had been convicted, clogging the International Criminal
1
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). By pursuing exhaustive
justice against his henchmen, the ICTY had denied Bosnian Muslims,
Croats, and Serbs the most basic justice of seeing Milošević convicted
and punished swiftly and publicly.
2
Milošević’s case, although extreme, is not unique. It epitomizes
deeper problems with international criminal justice. Fired by idealism
and the laudable legacy of the post–World War II Nuremberg
Tribunal, the United Nations (UN) and Western nations began
setting up international criminal tribunals in the early 1990s. In 1993
and 1994, the UN Security Council created the ICTY and its sister
3
court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The
UN, in cooperation with national governments, created other hybrid
tribunals that blend international and domestic legal approaches in
partnerships with nations such as Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Cambodia,
4
East Timor, and Bosnia. In 2002, the Rome Statute created the first
permanent international criminal court, the International Criminal
5
Court (ICC). In 2009, the ICC dared to issue an arrest warrant for a
sitting head of state, Omar Bashir of Sudan, for his role in the Darfur

1. See Vesna Peric Zimonjic & David Randall, ‘Justice Cheated’ as Milosevic Is Found
Dead in His Prison Cell, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 12, 2006, at 2; Editorial, The Death of
Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A26.
2. In late 2008, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted Colonel
Bagosora for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes fourteen years after the fact,
after a six-year trial involving 242 witnesses. See Lydia Polgreen, Senior Rwandan Officer and
Two Accomplices Are Found Guilty of 1994 Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A11.
3. S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY); S.C.
Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR).
4. For a discussion of these hybrid tribunals, see William W. Burke-White, A Community
of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1,
30–61 (2003).
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
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6

genocide. But the idealistic plans of all these tribunals are foundering
on practical shoals, overwhelmed by hundreds of cases and protracted
proceedings. Their substantive aspirations have not been built upon
solid, realistic procedural foundations.
More generally, international criminal law has reinvented the
wheel. Though scholarship in this growing field has flourished since
7
the early 1990s, it has not engaged with its counterparts in American
8
or European criminal procedure. Thus, international- and domestic6. See Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 21 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc639078.pdf. Notably, the arrest warrant for Bashir includes war crimes and crimes against
humanity, but not genocide charges due to the difficulty of winning a genocide conviction.
7. In the United States, international criminal law scholarship has focused on the forms of
responsibility, the morality of justice, and the establishment of international tribunals, rather
than on the structures and procedures on which this Article focuses. See generally MARTHA
MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998) (discussing the moral choices of
post-conflict justice); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (discussing the moral
underpinnings of transitional justice); José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons
from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999) (considering how the ICTR affected the Rwandan
judiciary); Burke-White, supra note 4 (examining the impact of hybrid courts); Allison Marston
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005)
(examining forms of criminal responsibility); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional
Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004) (considering justice in times of
transition); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A
Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (2001) (analyzing the United
States’ position on jurisdiction under the ICC and its potential ramifications); Jenia Iontcheva
Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985
(2007) (focusing on network effects among tribunals); Laura A. Dickinson, Note, The Promise
of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003) (examining hybrid tribunals). In Europe, the
discipline has focused on substantive crimes and doctrinal interpretation. See generally
GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS (2005)
(considering the definitions of international crimes); William Schabas, National Courts Finally
Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 39 (2003) (discussing
national court interpretations of genocide).
8. See generally LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2002)
(exploring some ICC rules of procedure); 2 I N T E R N AT I O N A L C R I M I N A L L AW :
P R O C E D U R A L A N D E N F O R C E M E N T M E C H A N I S M S ( M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed.
1 9 9 9 ) ( e x p l a i n i n g p r o c e d u r a l i s s u e s, b u t w i t h o u t a c o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s o f
d o m e s t i c p r a c t i c e ) ; Máximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International
Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835 (2005) (addressing comparative criminal procedure in
international tribunals); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 429 (2003) (considering the development of international judicial institutions, but
without reference to criminal procedure); M i c h a e l P. S c h a r f, Trading Justice for Efficiency:
Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1070 (2004) (considering
plea bargaining before international courts, but with only limited domestic comparative
analysis); Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in International
Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (2008) (considering how certain procedures influence the
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criminal-procedure scholarship have developed independently and
failed to learn from each other.
Though the international and domestic settings differ
substantially, international and domestic enforcement and procedure
share much in common. The scholarly gap between the two fields is
especially glaring on issues of institutional design and structural
constraints. Substantive domestic criminal law has occasionally
influenced substantive international law and vice versa, when national
9
courts have enforced international law. But international criminal
procedure has largely overlooked the structural, institutional, and
political lessons it could glean from domestic-criminal-procedure
10
scholarship.
Bringing the lessons of domestic criminal law to international
criminal law promises to illuminate and advance international
scholarship. International scholars have thrived on dreams of
subjugating politics to law and holding the worst of the worst
11
accountable. Although these dreams have spurred the development
of international criminal courts, they have hindered systemic and
political analysis of how these systems actually work. In contrast,
domestic American procedural scholarship has dissected the systemic
factors, rational actors, incentives, and institutional design choices
12
that shape domestic criminal enforcement. We hope to inject a

deterrent effect of international tribunals); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International
Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005) (examining the domestication of international
criminal law and possibilities for state cooperation, but not directly engaging with procedural
issues).
9. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53,
106–07 (2008) (considering the domestic application of the ICC Rome Statute by Congolese
courts).
10. For the few articles that have addressed procedural issues, see Langer, supra note 8, at
847–53; Scharf, supra note 8, at 1074–80; Turner, supra note 8, at 30–51.
11. See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 1–36, 147–205 (2000) (discussing the idealist motivations for
international criminal justice); Stephen Krasner, Pitfalls of International Idealism, 8 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 61 passim (2003) (describing international criminal justice as part of a
movement toward “international idealism,” according to which “normative structures can
constrain state behavior, and that if we could get these normative structures built into the
international system, the world would be a better place”).
12. The master of this institutional understanding of criminal procedure is William Stuntz.
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 791–818 (2006) (arguing that constitutional overregulation of criminal procedure leads to
pathological political phenomena, such as overpunishment and discriminatory prosecution);
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L.
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needed note of realism into idealistic international aspirations as the
ICC comes of age.
Our aim is to show how the lessons of domestic, especially
American, criminal procedure can make international criminal justice
more effective. Part I provides an overview of the two systems, to set
the stage for comparisons and contrasts. Part II examines the mindset
and Part III considers the politics of international criminal justice.
Part IV draws lessons for international case management, and Part V
offers similar lessons for pretrial and trial procedures.
We begin in Part I with a bird’s-eye view of the functions and
goals of the two systems. International criminal justice could in theory
pursue transnational crimes or crimes that national governments will
not prosecute, but in practice targets the most severe atrocities such
as genocide. American federal criminal enforcement targets some
crimes that states will not prosecute and used to focus on interstate
crimes, but the federal system increasingly is handling many of the
most serious crimes. Pragmatic considerations, such as resources and
interest, drive federal jurisdiction rather than abstract, theoretical
categories of interstate commerce. In both systems, these functions of
justice determine the purposes of punishment. Domestic criminal law

REV. 2548, 2550–58 (2004) (arguing that law has less effect on plea bargains than do voters’ and
prosecutors’ preferences, budget constraints, and other forces); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523–29, 533–39 (2001) (arguing
that politics and prosecutorial discretion lead to increasingly broad criminal law and harsher
criminal punishment); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6–22, 65–74 (1997) (identifying problems with the current
allocation of power between courts and legislatures in the criminal justice system and
recommending a constitutional solution focused on criminal substance, not criminal procedure).
Others have contributed significant scholarship in this vein. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 40–61 (2003)
(discussing plea bargaining’s rise and its effect on criminal enforcement); Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 869, 876–84, 895–97 (2009) (discussing the enormous discretion of federal prosecutors
and recommending separation of investigators and advocates from adjudicators); Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2481–82, 2483–85,
2469–519 (2004) (arguing that plea bargains are made in the shadow of factors beyond the
expected outcome at trials, such as attorney competence, sentencing rules, and psychological
biases); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2121–23 (1998) (highlighting how America’s heavy reliance on plea bargaining has begun
to resemble a nonadversarial, administrative justice system); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and
Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 755–94 (2003) (describing
how the interaction between federal prosecutors and federal enforcement agents affects
enforcement discretion); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55
STAN. L. REV. 29, 48–58 (2002) (discussing prosecutorial screening as an alternative to plea
bargaining).
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seeks primarily to deter, incapacitate, and inflict retribution.
International criminal law has largely sought to ensure retribution as
well as international peace and security. But so long as it focuses on
the gravest atrocities, international law must also emphasize
restorative justice to heal the wounds of genocide and war. These
functional choices must inform how we understand and improve each
system’s procedural structures. Next, we quickly sketch the key
institutional features that make international criminal law political
and often ineffective and the ones that make domestic law more
efficient but also more insulated and amoral.
Parts II through V then apply the lessons of recent domesticcriminal-procedure scholarship to improve international criminal
tribunals’ effectiveness. We look primarily to American criminal
procedure because its federal structure resembles the international
layers of authority and because it has well-developed case
management techniques. Part II explores the mentality of
international justice. International lawyers often view criminal justice
as taming power through law, so courts need to seek lawyers with
more diverse and less biased ideologies. International-civil-service
reforms and secondments of domestic lawyers and judges could
address excessive staff turnover.
Part III delves into the problematic politics of international
justice and what it could learn from less-political domestic justice.
International mechanisms of appointment and reappointment can
leave prosecutors and judges insufficiently insulated from political
pressures. Because international prosecutors lack their own police
forces, they must rely on state cooperation to secure evidence,
interview witnesses, and make arrests. And international courts’
budgets are set through overtly political processes, which can press
courts to please key funders. Moreover, defense lawyers face financial
incentives to underlitigate cases. Domestic experiences illuminate
how one could insulate courts’ budgets and perhaps give defense
lawyers parity of resources. Other problems in international justice
are unavoidable; at best, we can recognize and minimize them.
Part IV focuses on the need for international case management.
International prosecutors have a nearly limitless universe of potential
cases but time and resources for only a few. The ICTY pursued too
many low-level cases only to clog the system and delay justice for
Milošević and other leaders, a failure that the ICC seeks to remedy.
Domestic courts have much experience with gatekeeping and sorting.
Triage mechanisms can select only those individuals most responsible,
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whose convictions would best serve restorative justice, and refer
lesser cases to national courts and motivate them to pursue them.
Another way to manage caseloads is through plea bargaining, which,
given international criminal justice’s purposes, must be transparent
and limited. Cooperation agreements can purchase testimony to bring
ringleaders to justice but require stronger safeguards. And more
consistent sentencing policies can prevent arbitrary disparities
between international and national sentences for the same conduct.
Part V considers procedural safeguards more broadly. Current
international procedures are an uneasy hybrid of inquisitorial and
adversarial systems without the essential checks of either one.
Surprisingly, there are few limits on witness coaching, and rules on
speedy trials and victims’ rights are too weak. The rules of discovery
and cross-examination are inadequate to prevent tampering with
witnesses and fabricating evidence. Domestic criminal procedure
offers helpful guidance for how to redesign these rules.
The Conclusion draws together the lessons that domestic
criminal procedure can offer international criminal law. It then
considers the converse question—namely, how can domestic criminal
procedure learn from international law’s idealism and politics?
Specifically, one of international law’s strengths and domestic law’s
weaknesses is accountability and oversight. Official reporting to
intergovernmental bodies, the demands of cooperation with nations,
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) monitoring all constrain
international prosecutors and provide transparency. Similar
mechanisms could better check domestic prosecutorial discretion and
make it more legitimate. There might even be ways to infuse more of
international lawyers’ idealistic mindset, leavening the often cynical
mindset of many domestic prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges.
I. COMPARING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
To draw lessons for international criminal justice from domestic
criminal procedure, one must understand their many similarities and
differences. We first consider the functions and then the penological
purposes of international and domestic criminal justice. Finally, we
provide an overview of how each system is structured and works,
noting particularly how both systems seek to achieve common ends.
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A. The Functions of International and Domestic Criminal Justice
As a newly created system, international criminal law could have
performed any number of distinct functions. It could have prosecuted
crimes that span national jurisdictions, ensured accountability when
national governments failed to act, or prosecuted the most significant
crimes regardless of where they occurred. We call these the
transnational, backstop, and atrocity functions, respectively. The
choice of function determines the goals and purposes of punishment
and should also influence key procedural rules. This Section briefly
explores those functional choices and analogizes them to the
functions of both state and federal criminal justice systems in the
United States.
Perhaps international criminal law should naturally have fought
supranational crimes that span jurisdictions, such as human
smuggling, drug trafficking, intellectual and maritime piracy, and
international terrorism. After all, national governments usually
cooperate internationally when they share common functional
13
needs. Investigating and prosecuting transnational crimes requires
multiple governments to coordinate efforts. Thus, international
criminal law originated with universal jurisdiction over piracy, the
14
quintessential transnational crime. If this transnational emphasis had
continued, international tribunals and procedures would have
spanned a very different set of substantive crimes. Some crimes would
have been less severe, and some of the wrongdoers would have been
much less culpable than others. What these crimes would all have
shared is a need for states to cooperate in stamping them out.
Secondly, international criminal law could have served as a
backstop, holding wrongdoers accountable when national
governments were unable or unwilling to act themselves. This
supplementary function would have been a logical response to state

13. See generally ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
ECONOMIC FORCES 1950–57 (1958) (describing various aspects of the integration of European
countries in the 1950s).
14. As Justice Story wrote: “A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani
generis” (an enemy of all mankind). Harmony v. United States (The Brig Malek Adhel), 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 210, 232 (1844); see also Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under
International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 791–98 (1988). As Eugene Kontorovich has argued,
piracy jurisdiction did not rest on the view that piracy was an atrocity or an especially heinous
crime. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 186 (2004).
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15

weakness or failure or to governmental culpability. This function
might have led to international jurisdiction over all crimes national
governments were unable or unwilling to prosecute, ranging from
genocide to theft. The international system would have intervened,
regardless of the nature of the crime, whenever domestic courts failed
to act. International criminal procedures would have predicated
international action on domestic inaction. They would have been
broad, flexible, and efficient enough to handle many, varied crimes,
16
especially those in failed or failing states.
A third possible function of international criminal law is to
prosecute the most serious or grave atrocities, whether or not they
have transjurisdictional elements. This atrocity function seems
improbable precisely because national governments often want to
prosecute atrocities themselves and would rarely cede jurisdiction
17
over these gravest crimes to international tribunals.
Yet international criminal justice has largely focused on
atrocities, perhaps as a legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which
responded to the Holocaust. Nuremberg’s express purpose, according
to the London Charter that established it, was “the just and prompt
trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European
18
Axis.” It received jurisdiction over only the gravest crimes: war
19
crimes, crimes against the peace, and crimes against humanity. The
U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.) decided to export their liberal and
legalist notions of justice, in stark contrast to the Nazi and Soviet
20
approaches to justice. This legalist element was reflected in
Nuremberg’s procedure, including full rights to counsel, extensive
15. See Stephen D. Krasner & Carlos Pascual, Addressing State Failure, FOREIGN AFF.,
July/Aug. 2005, at 153.
16. Hybrid tribunals established as joint ventures between domestic and international
authorities in weak states reflect this supplementary function. See, e.g., Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone arts. 4–5, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145 (recognizing jurisdiction over
international crimes, as well as over arson and abduction of girls in violation of Sierra Leonean
law); Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and
International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1095–96 (2004) (discussing the use of international
judges in courts in Hong Kong, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone).
17. See Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the
Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 375 (1999) (discussing
sovereignty costs in criminal prosecution).
18. Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement for
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 1, Aug.
8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
19. Id. art. 6.
20. BASS, supra note 11, at 147–206.
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opportunities for cross-examination by the defense, and frequent
21
decisions by the tribunal protecting defense rights. Though perhaps
inadequate from today’s perspective, the Nuremberg procedure was
designed to provide a free and fair trial, despite the costs and
22
logistical challenges.
Later courts continued this primary function of holding
wrongdoers accountable for atrocities. The ICTY was established
“for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious
23
violations of international humanitarian law.” Similarly, the
preamble of the Rome Statute (establishing the ICC) provides:
“[T]he most serious crimes of concern to the international community
24
as a whole must not go unpunished . . . .”
True, certain provisions of the Rome Statute suggest the
backstop function noted above—holding wrongdoers accountable
when national governments cannot or will not act. Article 17 of the
Rome Statute bars cases from the ICC while national governments
25
undertake their own genuine investigations and prosecutions. But
the ICC is already jurisdictionally limited to adjudicating the most
26
severe crimes. In other words, the ICC is a backstop to national
governments only within the narrow category of atrocities.
The focus on atrocities has largely driven the development of
both international jurisdiction and procedure. The tribunals for
Rwanda and Yugoslavia and the ICC have each only been given very
narrow subject-matter jurisdictions, largely over war crimes, crimes
27
against humanity, and genocide. Each of these tribunals has also
21. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, supra
note 18, art. 16(d) (conferring the right to defense counsel); id. art. 16(e) (conferring the right to
cross-examination); 9 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 665 (1947) (ruling in favor of defense rights to evidence).
22. See 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 98–102 (1947) (opening statement of Justice Robert Jackson, Nuremberg
Tribunal, Nov. 21, 1945, acknowledging that the court’s procedures and the prosecution’s
research were adequate but not “finished craftsmanship,” because of the need for swift justice
within months of victory).
23. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, ¶ 2.
24. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, pmbl.
25. Id. art. 17.
26. Id. arts. 6–8.
27. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, arts. 2–5 (defining the crimes within the ICTR’s
jurisdiction); S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, arts. 2–5 (defining the crimes within the ICTY’s
jurisdiction); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 5 (giving the
ICC jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide).
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developed procedures that focus on scrupulous procedural regularity
28
and eliciting truth at the expense of speed and efficiency. For
example, in its early years the ICTY relied almost exclusively on live
rather than affidavit testimony, to ensure full cross-examination of
29
witnesses. Even today, the ICC refuses to admit evidence provided
by third parties, such as the UN, when the prosecutor cannot fully
30
share that evidence with the defense.
Although elaborate procedures worked for twenty-two
defendants at Nuremberg and for the earliest Rwandans and
31
Yugoslavians, that model has grown problematic as the range of
cases has mushroomed. These tribunals remain limited to atrocities,
yet today there are probably thousands of war crimes, crimes against
32
humanity, and genocides each year. Moreover, as more than one
hundred nations have signed on to the ICC, the geographic reach and
number of potential cases has exploded. Thus, the procedural model
that sufficed for a few dozen Nazis is no longer viable.
This atrocity function of international criminal justice stands in
stark contrast to the functions of American criminal justice. Domestic
systems must prosecute exponentially more defendants and cases
28. For a discussion of the ICTY’s evidentiary standards, see Patricia M. Wald, To
“Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence”: The Use of Affidavit Testimony in
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 535, 537 (2001). Over time,
tribunals have developed their rules in an effort to process cases more quickly and handle
evidence more efficiently, but the results of these developments have been mixed. See Langer,
supra note 8, at 885–905. For example, the ICTY revised its rules of procedure to expedite trials
through pretrial hearings and affidavit testimony. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 65bis(A) (providing
for pretrial conferences); id. 71(A) (allowing greater use of affidavit testimony by deleting the
1995 rules requirement that such testimony only be used in “exceptional circumstances”).
29. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 71(a) (1995) (amended 1998) (allowing for affidavit testimony
only in “exceptional circumstances”).
30. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on
the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of the Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision
on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e)
Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused Together with Certain
Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008,” ¶ 97 (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf (overturning the trial chamber’s order to
release Lubanga Dyilo but maintaining the inadmissibility of nondisclosable evidence).
31. See Richard Goldstone, Assessing the Work of the United Nations War Crimes
Tribunals, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 4–8 (1997) (discussing the early work of the ICTY).
32. By February 1, 2006, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor had received 1,732
communications with regard to alleged international crimes possibly within the court’s
jurisdiction. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, UPDATE ON COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED
BY THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC (2006), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596D08D-D810-43A2-99BB-B899B9C5BCD2/277421/OTP_Update_on_
Communications_10_February_2006.pdf.
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across a far wider range of crimes. Unlike international criminal
tribunals, which can leave lesser crimes to national courts, domestic
courts must address the full range of crimes. To handle these
caseloads, American criminal procedures have emphasized efficiency
and case management, sometimes at the expense of perfect accuracy
33
and scrupulous procedures. Thus, American law and practice can
guide international law as its range and caseloads expand.
Moreover, America’s federal system of dual sovereignty, like its
international counterpart, must allocate cases across multiple levels.
To oversimplify, the Commerce Clause was once understood as
limiting federal jurisdiction to cases that spanned state borders,
34
reaching interstate but not intrastate crimes. (A few other
constitutional provisions allowed the federal government to punish
violations of certain exclusively federal concerns, such as federal tax
evasion and counterfeiting.) That interstate function of federal
criminal law resembled international criminal law’s original focus on
transnational crimes such as piracy. More recently, federal civil rights
35
prosecutions under the Fourteenth Amendment have circumvented
36
and substituted for racist and corrupt state government. In other
words, federal law served as a backstop.
This backstop function, however, has always been only a small
slice of American federal jurisdiction. As the interstate/intrastate
divide crumbled after the New Deal, federal criminal jurisdiction has
become a hybrid of two functions: targeting the most serious crimes

33. The best example of this efficiency mindset at the expense of procedural regularity is
the hypertrophy of American plea bargaining. See generally FISHER, supra note 12, at 40–47
(discussing how heavy caseloads encouraged prosecutors to plea bargain); MILTON HEUMANN,
PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS 24–32 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing how the perceived need to dispose of cases quickly
pushes prosecutors, district attorneys, and judges to plea bargain even in the absence of heavy
caseloads).
34. See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (finding federal
criminal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause over transporting lottery tickets across state
lines). For a historical discussion, see generally Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American
Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966) (enforcing a statute
criminalizing conspiracies to violate rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
36. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996) (reviewing federal convictions
and sentences arising out of the federal prosecution of Los Angeles police officers for beating
motorist Rodney King); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of
American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1140 (1995) (noting that the Civil Rights Acts
“conferred federal jurisdiction over state crimes where the affected citizens were denied their
rights or where state courts would not enforce them”).
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and those than span borders. Through a range of jurisdictional
hooks, today the federal government targets many of the gravest
38
crimes and leaves lesser crimes to state prosecutors. The
accommodation between federal and state levels has been pragmatic,
driven by resource allocation and interest rather than theoretical
categories of interstate versus intrastate matters. To handle the broad
range of cases and allocate it across state and federal systems,
domestic criminal procedure has had to learn to manage cases and
39
engage in gatekeeping effectively.
Though their functions differ somewhat, structurally and
procedurally, the international and domestic systems share much in
common. Ultimately, both seek to hold wrongdoers accountable
effectively and efficiently through legal processes. Both seek to
allocate cases between two tiers along somewhat similar functional
divides. Thus, it is particularly surprising that the two systems barely
engage each other and that scholars within each system rarely look to
their counterparts.
B. The Purposes of Criminal Law
Domestic and international criminal justice also serve somewhat
different purposes. Domestic criminal law serves four main, broad

37. Federal criminal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause is extremely broad though
not infinitely elastic. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–63 (1995).
38. Although states conduct most capital murder prosecutions, federal prosecutors have
taken over substantial shares of bank robberies, large drug-trafficking, organized crime, and
white-collar crime. See JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, FELONY SENTENCES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1996, at 3, 7 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 175045, 1999),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fsus96.pdf (noting that most bank robberies
are prosecuted federally, and that federal drug sentences are substantially longer on average
than state sentences); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, at tbl.5.17.2004, tbl.5.44.2004 (2009), http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/tost_5.html (indicating that in 2004, federal prosecutors handled roughly 13 percent
of drug trafficking prosecutions—201,760 felony convictions in state courts compared to 25,539
in federal courts—and 19 percent of fraud prosecutions—48,560 felony convictions in state
courts compared to 9,261 in federal courts); see also Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding
Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1439, 1456 (2004) (reporting the results of an empirical study indicating that federal
prosecutors are more likely to take cases involving large quantities of drugs and leave those
involving smaller quantities to the states).
39. See Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law
Enforcement, 2 CRIM. JUST. 81, 91–96 (2000) (describing the accommodation of federal and
state law enforcement as one of “negotiated boundaries,” in which substantive laws overlap but
resource constraints, policy priorities, local culture, and sources of information influence which
cases are dealt with federally and which are left to states).
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purposes: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
In recent decades, rehabilitation has fallen out of favor because of
41
doubts about its efficacy. Some scholars now promote expressive
condemnation, the need to denounce the wrong and reinforce
42
society’s norms. Notwithstanding vigorous disagreement, many
scholars and most laymen emphasize retribution as the primary
purpose of domestic criminal punishment and incapacitation as a
43
secondary goal. This approach stresses moral justice, but leaves
room for practical concerns as well.
If international law sought to serve as a backstop, a supplement
for deficient domestic criminal justice, its purposes would mirror
those of domestic criminal justice. Transnational crimes, such as
software piracy and smuggling, are often less morally freighted than
domestic crimes, so they might call for less emphasis on retribution
and more on deterrence. But, as we have explained, international
criminal law has largely neglected the transnational and backstop
functions.
Though domestic criminal law redresses a breathtakingly broad
array of crimes, from the gravest to the most trivial, international law
targets a few high-level, highly public, politically salient mass

40. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective
on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
41. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 7, 57 (1981); Alschuler, supra note 40, at 9; Robert Martinson, What
Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 25 (“With
few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had
no appreciable effect on recidivism.”).
42. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
594–601 (1996) (supporting expressive condemnation).
43. E.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 83 n.1 (1997) (collecting scholarship embodying retributivism’s resurgence); Alschuler,
supra note 40, at 15; Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts
as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 295–97 (2002) (finding, in
two empirical studies, that laymen’s punishment judgments were driven by just deserts and not
by deterrence considerations); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives
for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (finding, in two empirical studies, that
laymen’s punishment judgments were driven primarily by the seriousness of the offense rather
than the likelihood of recidivism, suggesting a dominant objective of retribution, not
incapacitation); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 477–78, 492–94 (1997); cf. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 19, 24 (2003) (identifying retribution as the dominant purpose and incapacitation as the
secondary purpose of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
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atrocities, which often arise out of political instability. Thus,
international criminal law is expected to serve not only the four
45
purposes of domestic criminal law but also a fifth one: restorative
46
justice. Because international criminal cases are high profile and
occur during or after conflicts, international criminal law is often
47
called upon to reconcile broken communities. With the advent of the
ICC, the demands on international tribunals have increased. Both
states and nongovernmental organizations have called on the ICC to
fulfill all of the functions of domestic law, in addition to promoting
48
international peace and security through restorative justice.
International criminal justice should focus its aims. Resources
are limited, so the international system cannot create meaningful
49
amounts of incapacitation or deterrence. Because it is so hard to
dispense much retail justice in the wake of a war or genocide,
international criminal law should focus on providing public
restoration, reconciliation, and retribution for the worst of the worst.
In other words, international criminal justice, which can use a few
cases to send messages, is better than domestic criminal justice at the
more symbolic functions of punishing, vindicating victims, teaching,
healing, and reconciling. International tribunals are ideally situated to
restore and reconcile because their cases are high profile and their

44. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 58–140 (2007) (discussing the temporal, territorial, and subject-matter
limitations of the ICC compared with other courts).
45. See Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the
New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 928–35 (2000)
(discussing the purposes and expectations of the ICTY).
46. While not entirely absent from American law, “[t]o date, restorative justice in the
United States has operated at the fringes of the criminal justice system with small programs,
often run by churches and private agencies, handling a relatively small number of juvenile cases
and cases involving minor offenses.” Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for
Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 413.
47. For discussions of international restorative justice, see DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE
WITHOUT FORGIVENESS passim (2000); Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond
Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 68, 79–83 (Robert
I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
48. For a list of statements by national officials detailing their expectations for the ICC, see
Burke-White, supra note 9, at 59–61.
49. While some have advocated international criminal justice as a deterrent, it is difficult to
document deterrence in the international context. See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can
International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 31 (2001) (“No
one should entertain the illusion that the relative success of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC
process, or the engagement of national and foreign courts, has somehow exorcised the specter of
genocide and other massive crimes from our midst.”).
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stage is global, rising above national politics and local ethnic tensions.
As Mark Osiel argues, atrocity trials should serve primarily as
pedagogical spectacles, telling stories and shaping national identity
50
and collective memory.
Of course, trials cannot create
comprehensive historical records; historians, truth commissions, and
51
commissions of inquiry are far better at that. But trials can
nevertheless publicly acknowledge atrocities and begin to restore
their wounds. They cannot prosecute every perpetrator nor make one
a scapegoat for many others. But even a handful of prosecutions, with
due process for defendants as well as sensitivity to victims, can make
these points. Nuremberg and South Africa are two well-known, albeit
very different, examples of how public tribunals can document
52
atrocities and clear the public record. International trials can also
present evidence in ways that publicly document atrocities, by for
example showing the “Scorpions” video in the Milošević trial, which
53
recorded the gruesome executions of six youths in Srebrenica.
Public retribution against political and military leaders is another
important purpose, because atrocities excite the public’s outrage and
demand for justice. Prosecutions denounce and condemn crimes,
54
underscoring their wrongness. Incapacitation should be central only
during ongoing conflicts when national courts are truly unable to act,
and even then only for the highest-level offenders.

50. MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 2–3, 39 (1997).
51. For an extended caution about the inability of international trials to document
atrocities comprehensively or to restore victims, see Mirjan Damaška, What Is the Point of
International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 332–43 (2008).
52. See, e.g., NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI WAR
CRIMES TRIALS CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 139–48 (2007) (describing the effects of
Nuremberg’s documentation of Nazi crimes); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS:
CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 24–32, 152–65 (2002) (describing the
reconciliatory effects of the South African Truth Commission); see also 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 22, at 98–
102 (opening statement of Justice Robert Jackson acknowledging that, although the individual
Nazi defendants needed no further incapacitation because “their personal capacity for evil is
forever past,” their evil deeds required retribution and deterrence, because “any tenderness to
them is a victory and an encouragement to all the evils which are attached to their names.
Civilization can afford no compromise with the social forces which would gain renewed strength
if we deal ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces now precariously
survive”).
53. Frank Petit, ICTY: The Domino Effect of a Video, INT’L JUST. TRIB., June 13, 2005,
http://www.rnw.nl/int-justice/article/icty-domino-effect-video.
54. See Damaška, supra note 51, at 343–47 (advocating making “the didactic function” the
primary goal of international criminal justice).

BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL

654

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM

[Vol. 59:637

The differences in purposes between the two systems do not
undermine the lessons of our comparative exercise. On the contrary,
the comparison provides insights into how international criminal law
can better achieve other goals, such as retribution, which the domestic
system serves reasonably well. It also highlights what international
criminal justice can learn by contrasting its strengths and weaknesses
with those of domestic criminal procedure. Larger, speedier domestic
systems are much better at deterring and incapacitating. International
criminal justice should acknowledge that its capacity is necessarily
much more limited. It cannot hope to match domestic deterrence and
incapacitation, but should instead emphasize punishing as well as
healing the wounds of atrocities.
C. An Overview of the Two Systems
1. International Criminal Justice. Scholars often describe the
courts that enforce international law as uncoordinated and perhaps
55
even ineffective. Over the last decade, however, new courts have
emerged rapidly and now enforce international law far more
systematically. Though it remains dysfunctional, international
criminal justice today is a nascent system guided by core principles.
In recent years, many more international, domestic, and hybrid
courts have begun to enforce international criminal law. At the
international level are courts established by international treaties or
by the UN Security Council: the ICC, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the
56
UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The ICC has jurisdiction
over international crimes committed on the territory of or by
nationals of the 110 States Parties to the Rome Statute as well as
57
crimes referred by the Security Council. In contrast, the ICTY,
55. E.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (2d ed. 1994) (suggesting that
international law is not properly law); Martinez, supra note 8, at 443 (noting that based on
common definitions of a system, “there is not now an international judicial system nor could one
exist in the absence of a central scheme of hierarchical relationships”).
56. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5; S.C. Res. 827,
supra note 3; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3; Statute of the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C.
Res. 1757, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). While the STL was created by the UN
Security Council acting under Chapter VII, elements of its structure and operation are more
similar to hybrid tribunals such as those discussed below.
57. For a list of the 110 States Parties, see The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2009). The ICC
investigation of the situation in Sudan was referred by the UN Security Council through
Resolution 1593 (2005) pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. Press Release, U.N. Sec.
Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International
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ICTR, and STL have limited jurisdiction, restricted to crimes in the
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Lebanon, respectively. Collectively,
these international tribunals reach very broadly, covering more than
58
half the world’s countries and about a third of its population. All
four courts are limited to the most serious crimes, namely war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide, and (for the STL) the
59
assassination of Rafik Hariri.
In addition, many national courts routinely prosecute and
60
adjudicate international crimes. Finally, hybrid tribunals sit halfway
between the domestic and international levels and rest on
61
cooperation between national and international institutions. Hybrid
courts were or are operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor,
62
Cambodia, and Sierra Leone. These courts draw authority from both

Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.
58. Roughly 1.9 billion people live in countries that are States Parties to the ICC. See CIA,
THE WORLD FACTBOOK passim (2009).
59. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 5; S.C. Res. 827,
supra note 3, arts. 1–5; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, arts. 2–6; Statute of the U.N. Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, supra note 56, art. 1.
60. Some domestic criminal justice systems, such as those in the Democratic Republic of
Congo or Chile, prosecute recent or past crimes based on territorial or nationality jurisdiction.
See, e.g., U.N. MISSION IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (MONUC), MONTHLY HUMAN
RIGHTS ASSESSMENT: JULY 2007 (2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,
COI,MONUC,,,46ee75401a,0.html. Others, such as those of Israel, Belgium, France, Germany,
and Spain, prosecute extraterritorial crimes based on universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Att’y Gen.
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Jer. D.C. 1961), aff’d 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. 1962) (Isr.); Hijazi v.
Sharon, Cour d’Appel [CA] [intermediate court of appeals] Brussels, June 26, 2002 (Belg.);
Cour de Cassation [Cass. crim.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction], Jan. 6, 1998, Bull. crim.,
No. 2, translated in 1 YB. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 598 (1998), nullifying and dismissing
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Privas (examining magistrate), Jan. 9, 1996 and Cour d’Appel
de Nimmes, Mar. 20, 1996 (Fr.); Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLGZ] [court of
appeals for selected matters in Bavaria], 23 May 1997 - 3 St 20/96 (F.R.G.) reprinted in part in
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 392 (1998) (Ger.); R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.)
(U.K. House of Lords proceeding on the extradition of Pinochet to face universal jurisdiction
charges in Spain).
61. See Burke-White, supra note 4, at 75–97.
62. Law on Amendments to the Law on Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE BIH, 24/02 (Aug. 29, 2002) (Bos.); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the
Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Cambodia); Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 16; G.A. Res 57/228, ¶¶ 1–4, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/228B (May
22, 2003); Burke-White, supra note 4, at 41–54 (describing hybrid courts operating in East
Timor); William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State
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63

national legislation and a UN mandate. They use both national and
foreign officials and apply a combination of domestic and
international law. They fill an impunity gap, serving as backstops
when international tribunals lack jurisdiction or are overwhelmed by
atrocities but national courts cannot or will not fill the need.
Each of these courts is independent, yet they have far more in
common than commentators recognize. First, international, domestic,
and hybrid criminal courts apply a common body of international law
defining three international crimes: war crimes, genocide, and crimes
64
against humanity. Second, international criminal courts have
65
developed detailed procedural rules, some of which have migrated
66
into the practice of hybrid tribunals as well. Third, culpability is
67
emerging as a gatekeeping criterion for selecting cases.
Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 285–89 (2008) (discussing
the creation and operation of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
63. See Dickinson, supra note 7, at 295 (discussing the features of hybrid courts).
64. While definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity have developed over time,
the Rome Statute fixes core definitions of these crimes. See generally GIDEON BOAS, JAMES L.
BISCHOFF & NATALIE REID, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PRACTITIONER LIBRARY:
VOLUME 2: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) (specifying the
elements of core crimes).
65. The ICTY developed rules of procedure and evidence for modern international
criminal tribunals. See ICTY R. P. & EVID.; Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice or
Military Justice: Which Is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules and Procedure and Evidence
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM J. INT’L L.J. 475,
485–528 (1995) (discussing the development of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
While the rules have been amended, they remain fairly stable. Compare ICTY R. P. & EVID.
(1995) (amended 1996), with ICTY R. P. & EVID. (2009). The ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence contain important innovations and reflect the state of the art. See generally ICC R. P.
& EVID.; Fabricio Guariglia, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International
Criminal Court: A New Development in International Adjudication of Individual Criminal
Responsibility, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1111 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
66. ICTY officials gave guidance to the new State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
resulting in procedures that reflect international practice more than traditional Bosnian
procedure and transformed Bosnia into a quasi-common-law system. See INDEP. JUDICIAL
COMM’N, HIGH JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL COUNCIL OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL COMMISSION JULY 2001–31 MARCH 2004, at
161–62 (2004) (“Some elements of the inquisitorial process were abandoned in favour of a more
adversarial process.”).
67. Compare, for example, Slobodan Milošević, a president who ordered and orchestrated
genocide, with Predrag Banović, a prison camp guard who beat detainees. See Prosecutor v.
Banović, Case No. IT-02-65, Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 31, 32, 34 (July 5, 2002) (charging
Banović, along with other guards at the Keraterm and Omarska prison camps, with crimes
against humanity). In its early days, the ICTY prosecuted any perpetrator over whom it could
secure custody, regardless of culpability. See Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the
Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
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Fourth, courts increasingly rely on the principle of subsidiarity to
allocate cases. Subsidiarity suggests hearing cases at the lowest level
of authority that can deal with them effectively—in the territorial
68
state when possible. Subsidiarity efficiently conserves international
resources and situates cases close to the events, evidence, and victims,
which aids restorative justice and reconciliation. The ICC implements
the principle of subsidiarity through the rule of complementarity,
which means that it hears cases only when national courts cannot or
69
will not act. The ICTY and ICTR accomplish the same goal by
referring cases back to national authorities when domestic courts
70
become able and willing to prosecute. In other words, international
71
courts serve as backstops. Even some national courts rely on the
principle of subsidiarity in deciding whether to exercise universal
72
jurisdiction. Collectively, these developments have grown into a
system for enforcing international criminal law.

and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a
Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 92, UN Doc. A/54/634 (1999)
(describing the ICTY’s difficulty in obtaining custody over leadership figures and prosecuting
any low-level indictees in custody). Political pressures to reduce the ICTY’s caseload led to the
use of culpability as a case selection device. See Judge Claude Jorda, President, ICTY, Address
to the United Nations Security Council (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8080
(suggesting that the tribunal only prosecute “the highest-ranking political, military, paramilitary
and civilian leaders”). The ICC also relies on culpability. See Office of the Prosecutor, ICC,
Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases 5 (June 2006) (unpublished draft policy paper, on
file with authors) (looking to the scale, nature, and impact of crimes).
68. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253,
amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1,
37 I.L.M. 56 and Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Mar. 10, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1
(implementing subsidiarity).
69. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 17.
70. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 11bis (providing for the referral of cases back to national
authorities); ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis (same); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2PT, Decision on Rule 11bis Referral, ¶ 42 (Sept. 1, 2005) (setting guidelines for referring cases).
71. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is
Domestic, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 339 (2006) (discussing the backstop function of international
law).
72. The influential Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction consider the “connection
between the requesting state and the alleged perpetrator, the crime, or the victim” and “the
place of commission of the crime.” PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28
(2001), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/princeton.html. Some national courts
implement subsidiary jurisdiction by prosecuting only when the territorial state does not.
Landesgericht Salzburg 38 Vr 1335/94, Hv 42/94 (May 31, 1995), enforcing /Re/ Dusko C.,
Oberster Gerichtshof, No. 15 Os 99/94 (July 13, 1994).
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2. Domestic Criminal Procedure. In contrast, domestic criminal
procedure in the United States is more efficient but has its own
pathologies. The coherence and professionalism that make it efficient
at handling large volumes of cases also make it opaque, insular, and
more amoral. As a result, domestic criminal procedure is better at
incapacitating cheaply but less successful at teaching lessons,
restoring communities and victims, and earning public confidence.
In its infancy, American criminal justice centered around public
morality plays (namely jury trials), much as the young system of
international criminal justice now does. Today, however, the domestic
system runs on a well-oiled plea-bargaining assembly line.
Professional (usually local) police investigate and arrest, often
interrogating and conducting searches in the process. After that,
professional prosecutors handle cases from charging through
conviction and sentencing. Prosecutors negotiate with defense
lawyers and make key decisions about whether and what crimes to
charge, what plea bargains to strike, and what sentences to specify in
73
their plea bargains.
Many features of this assembly-line criminal justice are worthy of
note. First, the system is designed to handle large volumes of cases.
Like international trials, jury trials are time-consuming and
expensive, and resources are limited, so plea bargains emerged as a
cheaper, more efficient way to maximize convictions at minimum
74
cost. Today, guilty pleas resolve 95 percent of adjudicated cases, and
most of these result from plea bargains. Both sides’ lawyers are
professionals, repeat players who know the going rates for particular
crimes. They strike bargains that lower individual sentences in
exchange for increasing the total volume of cases processed. They
often strike cooperation deals, lowering defendant A’s sentence in
exchange for his undercover help or testimony against defendant B.
This approach maximizes incapacitation and perhaps deterrence. The
downside is that the assembly line trades off some of the softer, moral
values that citizens expect from criminal justice. These include giving
citizens their day in court, letting the public sit in judgment as jurors,

73. STEPHANOS BIBAS, ASSEMBLY-LINE CRIMINAL JUSTICE chs. 1–2 (forthcoming 2011).
74. The best historical account of plea bargaining emphasizes that it emerged as a tool to
lighten prosecutors’ and judges’ workloads and avoid time-consuming and unpredictable jury
trials. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 12–44, 111–24.
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vindicating victims, denouncing wrongs, and restoring wounded
75
relationships among victims, wrongdoers, and communities.
Second, professionals often see it as their job to husband and
allocate their scarce time and money. Because there are far more
crimes and eligible cases than prosecutors can handle, police and
prosecutors gatekeep. They apply formal or informal criteria,
targeting the most urgent kinds of cases and getting rid of smaller
cases involving first-time or sympathetic defendants. They routinely
screen out cases based on weak evidence, minimal culpability, or lack
76
of seriousness. They may, for example, routinely dismiss thefts of
less than $100 or possession of less than an ounce of marijuana unless
77
the defendant is a recidivist. Prosecutors often divert minor cases for
drug treatment and dismiss them upon successful completion of a
program. They sometimes decline to prosecute lesser cases when
78
defendants make restitution or civil remedies are available. Federal
agents and prosecutors may decline cases that are less serious or more
effectively handled at the state level. Conversely, federal officials are
especially likely to pursue cases in which state criminal justice is
ineffective or suspect, such as cases of public corruption or civil rights
79
violations by local officials. These effective screening and allocation
measures are analogous to the international principles of subsidiarity
and complementarity.
Third, the system is hidden from public view and insulated from
public control. Police do not announce whom they will stop and what
crimes they will target, lest they encourage more crimes within their
blind spots. Prosecutors do not explain their decisions to charge,
decline, or plea bargain, lest they undercut deterrence or create
grounds for appeal. Discovery, grand jury proceedings, plea bargains,
80
and hearings are hidden or obscure. Grand juries are rubber stamps
and petit juries are rare; instead, prosecutors and defense lawyers run
75. See BIBAS, supra note 73, chs. 1, 3; Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing SubstantiveCriminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1400–04, 1406–07 (2003) [hereinafter Bibas, Harmonizing];
Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 947–48 (2006) [hereinafter Bibas, Transparency].
76. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2470.
77. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ WRITTEN GUIDELINES FOR
THE DECLINATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: A REPORT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 11 tbl.3, 22 tbl.11 (1979).
78. See Bibas, Transparency, supra note 75, at 933 & n.91.
79. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
80. Bibas, Transparency, supra note 75, at 923–24.
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the show. Judges rubber-stamp plea deals struck in secret; public
81
court hearings are empty ceremonies with preordained results.
Because domestic criminal justice is far from transparent, it is not
accountable. District attorneys, for example, are elected. But their
elections are not informed referenda on prosecutorial policies, most
of which are secret or hidden from view. Electoral races are distorted
by huge incumbency advantages and driven by occasional scandals
82
and unrepresentative, high-profile celebrity trials.
Lack of
transparency thus hobbles accountability.
Domestic criminal justice, then, has succeeded perhaps too well
in processing cases efficiently, at the expense of some of criminal
justice’s other aims. International criminal justice can learn both from
its successes and its shortcomings.
II. THE MENTALITY OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONERS
One of the more troubling aspects of international criminal law is
the mentality that many practitioners share. This Part begins by
exploring their precommitments and contrasting them with the
greater range of views in domestic systems. After that, we consider
the career paths of international criminal justice practitioners, again
contrasting them with domestic career trajectories.
A. Ideologies and Worldview
Culture and people define organizations as much as laws do.
That is true of international prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges,
who strive to subordinate power and politics to the rule of law. In his
opening statement at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson described his
mandate as defending civilization itself, taming despotic power
83
through the law. The emphasis has been on victorious outcomes and
only secondarily on just processes. When civilization itself is at stake,
conviction takes precedence over adjudication. Many later officials,
including the ICC’s presiding judge and chief prosecutor, still echo

81. Id. at 929–30.
82. Id. at 935; see also Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 983–91 (2009); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor
Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 591–602 (2009).
83. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, supra note 22, at 102–04.

BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL

2010]

INTERNATIONAL IDEALISM

12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM

661

Jackson’s emphasis on taming raw power rather than observing legal
84
niceties.
This ideology of international justice is even more apparent
among some rank-and-file staff. Junior staffers are often recent law
school graduates who have chosen a career in international criminal
law out of a devotion to this mission. In the words of one such ICTY
judicial clerk, “I came to work here because I wanted to stop the
violence; I wanted law to be a meaningful tool to constrain the likes
85
of Milošević.” A staffer in the Chambers at the ICC emphasized the
court’s solicitude toward victims: “I chose the ICC because we are the
86
voice—the only voice—of the victims.” Even defense counsel, who
might be expected to carry a different set of biases, often have
87
deeper, systemic goals of strengthening international law. Some
defense counsel admit that they took their jobs because they wanted
88
to help develop international criminal justice. Others had more
explicit agendas: “My primary motivation was the fact that the
conflicts that led to the war [in Rwanda] and crimes in the respective
countries were a result of foreign interference, neocolonialism, lack of
89
democracy, poverty and economic exploitation . . . .”
This is not to say that international tribunals or their staffs are
inherently biased. In fact the ICTY has acquitted a number of
90
defendants. Rather, tribunal officials routinely stress the importance
91
of due process and the rule of law. Nonetheless, international

84. Judge Philippe Kirsch, President, ICC, Statement at the Ceremony for the Solemn
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6A3D5C50-CB29-4C1B-AFDD-CFE40CA535
39/146377/PK_20030616_En1.pdf (“We are part of humanity’s response to the countless victims
and their plight . . . .”); Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement at the Ceremony for the Solemn
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003),
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/MorenoOcampo16June03.pdf (describing the
mission to punish atrocities and protect victims).
85. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, in The
Hague, Neth. (Oct. 23, 2008).
86. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, ICC, in The Hague, Neth. (Oct. 24, 2008).
87. But see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in
International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 549 (2008) (suggesting that “most lawyers
are not driven by political or ideological motivations in their representation of international
criminal defendants”).
88. Id. at 548.
89. Id. at 549 n.77.
90. See ICTY Acquittals, http://www.icty.org/sid/9984 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
91. E.g., Kirsch, supra note 84 (describing the ICC’s “commitment to independence,
transparency, and the Rule of Law”).
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criminal law’s civilizing mission is pervasive and powerful. In mindset,
if not openly, tribunal staff may be inclined to presume guilt, to view
convictions as more important than process, and to base charging
decisions more on potential impact than on evidence. As one ICTY
judicial assistant stated in a blunt and perhaps extreme admission:
“Of course we have a presumption of innocence here, but . . . we all
know they are guilty. Our job is to convict them according to the
92
law.” This mission to convict threatens fair, dispassionate
adjudication.
Domestic criminal justice offers two useful ways to limit this
troubling missionary ideology: differentiated worldviews and venue
changes. The missionary mindset spans all three international
branches: prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges’ chambers. This
imbalance subverts judges’ and defense counsel’s ability to check and
balance prosecutors. In contrast, though domestic prosecutors seek
93
convictions to incapacitate and inflict retribution, other actors have
different roles. Domestic defense attorneys often want to help the less
fortunate, to rehabilitate perpetrators, or to uphold the integrity of
94
the system through strong criminal defense. And judges generally
strive to be neutral, to guarantee fair proceedings and due process.
The variety of perspectives creates equilibrium, checking
prosecutorial zeal even within an adversarial system.
To guarantee the system’s integrity, international criminal justice
needs a broader range of viewpoints. Instead of relying exclusively on
international legal idealists, international courts should also tap
domestic judiciaries. Domestic judges and law clerks are used to
remaining neutral and even-handed in less public and sensational
cases; domestic defense lawyers understand the need to defend
zealously instead of presuming guilt. As we discuss below, one way to
diversify the ideologies of international tribunal staff would be to
have national systems temporarily detail their personnel to
95
international courts for short- or medium-term rotations. In
addition, signing bonuses or similar incentives could help recruit

92. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, supra note 85.
93. See, e.g., JOHN KROGER, CONVICTIONS: A PROSECUTOR’S BATTLE AGAINST MAFIA
KILLERS, DRUG KINGPINS, AND ENRON THIEVES 11–22 (2008).
94. See, e.g., KEVIN DAVIS, DEFENDING THE DAMNED: INSIDE A DARK CORNER OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 47–59 (2008); MICKEY SHERMAN, HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THESE
PEOPLE? 31–59 (2008).
95. See infra Part II.B.

BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL

2010]

INTERNATIONAL IDEALISM

12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM

663

judges, lawyers, and clerks with relevant domestic experience for
permanent jobs.
Some international prosecutions also suffer bias because the
same court has repeatedly heard cases based on identical or similar
facts. For example, the ICTY repeatedly hears evidence about the
existence of wars in the Balkans and particular massacres such as
Srebrenica. Joint trials are often efficient and desirable when
common facts relate to multiple defendants. Occasionally, however,
joint trials are infeasible, when, for example, one defendant is
arrested much later than his alleged accomplices. A court may thus be
biased or perceived as biased when it has already adjudicated facts
central to the later defendant’s criminal responsibility. If, for instance,
previous defendants testified that the current defendant had ordered
them to kill civilians, the current defendant may find it hard to
relitigate his command responsibility or role in a joint criminal
96
enterprise. Domestic procedure deals with this and other problems
97
by allowing changes of venue. As most international courts consist
98
of multiple trial chambers, defendants could enjoy the advantages of
99
a new venue by being assigned to a different trial chamber. When
the danger of bias is especially grave, a senior official’s later trial
100
could occur before an entirely different international court.
B. Career Opportunities and Loyalties
To attract and keep good personnel, international courts need to
offer them good career prospects. Although staffers can easily move
laterally from one court to another, they find it very hard to move
upwards. This acute lack of vertical opportunities undermines morale

96. For a discussion of these forms of indirect criminal responsibility, see generally Danner
& Martinez, supra note 7.
97. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a); see also Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the
Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1537 (1993) (discussing the merits of changes
of venue when jury pools are distinct).
98. For a discussion of the structure of the trial chambers at the ICTY, see About the
ICTY: Chambers, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/Chambers (last visited Nov. 8,
2009).
99. Presently, trials are assigned to a trial chamber based on docket vacancies. See
Theodore Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals, 99
AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 364 (2005).
100. For example, after years of ICTY trials of crimes by Serbian forces, the judges of the
ICTR could have sat by designation for later trials of senior officials, avoiding bias from
previously adjudicated evidence. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, arts. 12, 13ter–13quater (describing
the qualifications of ad litem judges and the process for their appointment).
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and contributes to high turnover. International tribunals thus lack
continuity, squander human capital, and waste resources training staff
who remain for only a year or two.
International criminal tribunals should have no shortage of
talent. They attract many of the best and brightest internationally
minded young lawyers from around the world. Moreover, they offer
101
relatively generous and often tax-free salaries.
One group of lawyers drawn to international criminal courts is
102
dubbed a cadre of “post-conflict justice junkies.” Justice junkies
thrive on working in war zones, either to get an adrenaline rush or to
do some good. They often hop horizontally from court to court,
conflict to conflict, until they leave the system for personal reasons or
to settle down. Although they may hope to move upward at a new
103
court, they care more about the freedom to move to the latest hot
spot than upward mobility. One former ICC staffer captures the
mindset of these justice junkies: “I came six months ago, but [am]
getting restless now. Time to start thinking about [the] next
104
opportunity.” They remain at a court for only a year or two and
105
start looking for their next move almost as soon as they arrive.
Another part of the talent pool consists of career seekers. Unlike
justice junkies, career seekers want more stable job prospects in
justice or, perhaps, international justice. They may choose a particular
court for its prestige or the nature of its work, not because it is near
an active conflict. They want not horizontal but vertical mobility and
growing responsibilities within a particular court. Yet the structure of
international courts often fails these career seekers, who are given
few opportunities to advance. Once they see how limited their career
trajectory is, career seekers quickly abandon the international judicial
system for better prospects back home. A former ICTY staffer
explains: “[I left the Tribunal because] there was nowhere for me to

101. Salaries at the ICTY are based on UN job classifications and range from $60,000 to
$80,000 for junior professionals. See UN Human Res. Mgmt., United Nations Salaries,
Allowances, Benefits and Job Classification, http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_
allowances/salary.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
102. Elena A. Baylis, Tribunal Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies, 10 OR. REV.
INT’L L. 361, 363 (2008).
103. Baylis suggests that the frequent movement of these “justice junkies” may in part be
driven by the potential for upward mobility at the time of a move to a new court with greater
staff vacancies. Id. at 374.
104. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, supra note 85.
105. See Baylis, supra note 102, at 373 (referring to the “short duration[s of] postings”).
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go. There are very few senior legal officer positions and becoming a
106
judge is impossible—they are elected by the Security Council.”
Another ICTY staff member put it bluntly: “I came with high hopes
but they were shattered. I would be stuck as a P-2 forever with an
107
iron-ceiling above me. So I packed my bags and left.”
Both justice junkies and career seekers have few incentives to
stay for any length of time, so both groups tend to move on after just
a year or two. Early departures and high turnover rates have become
a major problem. The ICTY has recognized that its high staff
turnover hinders its ability to complete its mission and that existing
108
incentives to stay are inadequate. Though the ICC is a permanent
court in no danger of closing, it has similar staff retention problems.
In its first three years, the prosecutor’s office had lost twenty-two of
its 146 staffers, fourteen of whom left before their contracts had
109
ended. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the prosecutorial turnover
rate has increased since 2006 and that judicial chambers and defense
110
counsel face similar retention problems.
Some staff attrition is unavoidable, but high turnover rates drain
human capital. Although longer employment contracts and financial
incentives to renew could keep justice junkies in place slightly longer,
they are likely to tribunal-hop regardless. There is more hope for
111
remedying the plight of career seekers. The UN Common System,
112
which international tribunals use, limits professional advancement
106. Interview with former Staff Member, ICTY, in N.Y., N.Y. (Jan. 15, 2009).
107. Telephone Interview with former Staff Member, ICTY (Jan. 18, 2009).
108. Letter from Patrick Robinson, President, ICTY, to President, UN Sec. Council, para.
30 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20
Publications/CompletionStrategy/Completion_Strategy_24nov2008_en.pdf.
109. Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Report on the Activities Performed During the First
Three Years (June 2003 – June 2006), para. 74 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821-725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport
20060914_English.pdf; see also Dr. Edmond H. Wellenstein, Dir.-Gen., Task Force ICC,
Statement at the 2d Public Hearing of the Office of the Prosecutor (Sept. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Network
+with+Partners/Public+Hearings/Second+Public+Hearing/Session+1/Dr+Edmond+H++Wellen
stein+Director+General+Task+Force+ICC.htm (demanding that the Prosecutor address staff
turnover).
110. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, supra note 86.
111. See Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 109, para. 74 (“[T]he Office seeks to attract the
most qualified individuals in the field of international justice.”).
112. See Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Res. ICC-ASP/2/Res.2 passim (Sept. 12, 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_
docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-ASP2-Res-02-ENG.pdf (requiring that the ICC establish terms of
employment consistent with the UN Common System for ICC employees). For a discussion of
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and bases promotions more on seniority than on merit. Staff who
left institutions that use this system cite lack of opportunities for
professional growth and promotion as the two most common reasons
114
for leaving. The wide staffing pyramids of international tribunals,
with many lower-ranked positions and few senior ones, exacerbate
115
the problem of career advancement. Moreover, the most senior
positions, such as tribunal judges, are permanently out of reach, filled
through political elections.
Domestic career paths offer a promising alternative. Domestic
prosecutors and public defenders can move up to supervisory
positions and more desirable units based on talent and hard work as
116
well as seniority. In some countries, such as Germany, the judiciary
117
is a meritocratic civil service. Career seekers could begin in the
domestic system, be seconded (detailed) to international courts for a
time, and later move up the ladder by returning to their domestic
systems. Justice Jackson, who took a leave from the Supreme Court
to serve as the U.S. Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, is perhaps the
best example of how secondment can bring valuable skills and
expertise. Though secondment of domestic officials to international
tribunals occurs occasionally, it should become the norm, not the
exception. The ICC could expand its existing cooperation agreements
the United Nations Common System, see UN Human Res. Mgmt., UN Common System,
http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/common.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
113. See Glentis T. Thomas, 2d Sec’y, Delegation of Ant. & Barb., Statement on Behalf of
the Group of Seventy-Seven and China on Agenda Item 125: United Nations Common System,
in the 5th Committee During the Main Part of the 63d Session of the General Assembly ¶ 5
(Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=081027a (“It is
important to underline that lack of opportunities for career development was cited in most cases
in headquarters locations as the main cause of voluntary turnover . . . .”); see also Alexander
Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Reinvigorating the United Nations: Reform, Rights
and Reconfiguration, Address Before the 52d Session of the General Assembly (Oct. 3, 1997),
available at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1997/unga3october97.html (noting the
disproportionate role played by seniority).
114. HUMAN RES. POLICY DIV., INT’L CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, RESULTS OF THE GLOBAL
STAFF SURVEY ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION (2008), http://icsc.un.org/resources/hrpd/
gssr/docs/ICSCStaffsurvey.pdf.
115. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, arts. 36, 42
(describing the qualification and election of judges and the Prosecutor).
116. Of course, politics also plays a large role in American states’ and counties’ elections for
district attorneys and judges. We do not wish to replicate every quirk of the American system,
particularly its politicization, but simply to suggest the need for incentives to work hard and
perform well to get ahead.
117. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 853 (1985) (noting that the German civil service system prevents politics from influencing
the appointment and promotion of judges at most levels).
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with its States Parties to facilitate secondment and to improve
candidates’ postsecondment prospects back home. National civil
services could amend their personnel and benefits policies to promote
international secondments as valuable credentials for career
advancement.
Routine secondment of career seekers could also alleviate the
problematic worldview that many international tribunal staff now
118
share. Having been socialized within national judicial systems,
secondees are more likely to have diverse ideologies befitting their
roles, instead of categorically leaning toward conviction.
More generally, the UN Common System and the international
civil service urgently need reform. Though a detailed exploration of
these points is beyond the scope of this Article, civil-service systems
should allow for rapid advancement based on merit, create incentives
to retain good staff, and facilitate careers that bridge international
and domestic service.
III. THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Though international criminal justice seeks to tame politics
through law, it remains deeply political. Politics infects the election
and appointment of key officials, state cooperation in investigations
and arrests, and court funding. It skews outcomes, weakens
independence, and undercuts the appearance of impartiality.
Domestic judiciaries offer examples of how to insulate justice from
politics and how to acknowledge and defuse the politics that remains.
This Part explores the politics of international criminal justice
and draws lessons from domestic judiciaries. First, we consider the
politics and elections of judges, prosecutors, and other senior officials.
Next, we turn to a unique aspect of international criminal justice—the
need for state cooperation to conduct investigations or undertake
arrests. Third, we examine the politics of funding international
tribunals. Finally, we consider the politics of defense resources and
the need to ensure equality of arms.
A. Appointments and Elections
International prosecutors and judges are elected or appointed by
processes that often turn into political beauty pageants. To give but
one example, when judicial vacancies arise on the ICTY, the UN
118.

See supra Part II.A.
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Secretary General solicits each state to nominate up to two
candidates. The Security Council then narrows the slate to a
maximum of forty-two candidates. The General Assembly elects
119
judges for four-year terms with the possibility of reappointment.
International tribunals’ statutes impose additional requirements that
further politicize selection. For example, ICC judges must be diverse
120
in geography and sex and represent the world’s main legal systems.
The cumbersome electoral system injects dysfunctional
international politics into law. Many states nominate candidates
121
based on patronage, not merit. For judges from developing states,
an international judicial appointment with its relatively high salary is
a plum political appointment. One notable case of presumed political
cronyism involved a Nigerian judge at the ICTY who routinely slept
through trials but was nonetheless nominated by his government for
122
reelection. Political horse-trading can also lead to the selection of
less qualified candidates. Thomas Franck analogized the UN General
Assembly not to a principled court “but a bazaar, with its emphasis
123
on price and trade.” In this context, bloc politics, bargaining, and
horse-trading matter more than merit.
Take, for example, the 2003 election of the ICC’s first group of
judges. The election of eighteen judges took thirty-three rounds of
voting over three days. The eighty-five voting states had to select

119. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 13bis. The UN Security Council elects the ICTY
Prosecutor, subject to veto by permanent members. Id. art. 16(4). ICC judicial appointments are
likewise politicized. Each state party nominates one candidate. Candidates with criminal
procedure experience compose one list; those with international law expertise form a second.
The States Parties then elect judges from these lists by a two-thirds vote. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 36. The Assembly of States Parties (ASP)
creates a list of candidates for head ICC Prosecutor and elects the Prosecutor by secret ballot.
The Prosecutor then puts forth a list of three candidates for each deputy prosecutor job, and the
States Parties likewise elect them by secret ballot. Id. art. 42(4).
120. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 36(8). The ICTY
statute requires that judicial elections take “due account of the adequate representation of the
principal legal systems of the world.” S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 13bis(1)(c).
121. Studies of the election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights offer strong
evidence that patronage plays a large part in nominations. See JUTTA LIMBACH ET AL.,
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2003) (“[N]omination often involves a ‘tap on the shoulder’ from
the Minister of Justice or Foreign Affairs, and frequently rewards political loyalty more than
merit.”).
122. Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387,
398 (2009).
123. Thomas M. Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double Standard at the United
Nations?, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 811, 833 (1984).
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candidates according to prescribed ratios of criminal-justice experts to
international experts, men to women, and various geographic
124
regions. Ballots that did not meet these criteria were excluded,
125
which may have compromised the validity of the election.
Geographic and bloc politics resulted in bargaining and horse-trading
126
that may have hampered the selection of the most qualified judges.
Problematic backroom deals aside, the prospect of reelection
creates troubling incentives for sitting international judges and
prosecutors. When reelection is possible, judges and prosecutors’
interests may be more aligned with the states that nominated or
127
supported them than with justice itself. Desire for reappointment
can also create conflicts of interest. For example, an ICTY advisory
committee decided not to investigate possible international crimes by
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces during the war in
128
Kosovo, and ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte accepted this
129
recommendation. Because her reappointment required the support
of the U.S. and the U.K., which had led the NATO bombing
campaign, her decision appeared to be less than independent or
130
impartial.
Although some horse-trading is unavoidable given the small
electorate of repeat players, reforms can limit its pernicious effects.

124. Some commentators suggest that the ASP had to elect a minimum of six women and
three judges each from Africa, Latin America, and Western Europe, and two from Asia. Darin
R. Bartram & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The ICC’s First False Step, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2003, at A9.
125. Id.
126. Candidates spent weeks before the election in a “beauty contest” at the UN involving
substantial cross-issue bargaining. See Lauren Etter, Call for ICC to Learn ICTY Election
Lessons, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, Nov. 26, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/
component/content/article/164-icc/28481.html (describing the perception of some judges and
observers that the elections were determined by political deal-making); cf. Bartram & Rivkin,
supra note 124 (suggesting the election was tainted). But see Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in
Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S. Policy Towards the International
Criminal Court, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 557, 581–82 (2003) (suggesting that the elected judges were
qualified).
127. See Voeten, supra note 122, at 389 (suggesting that international judges “depend in
large measure on the willingness of national governments to advance their candidacies for high
international judicial office”).
128. Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, ¶ 91 (June 13, 2000), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf
(recommending that the NATO bombing campaign not be investigated).
129. Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 505 (2001).
130. See id. (questioning Del Ponte’s decision).
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Truly secret ballots make it impossible to enforce backroom
131
Alternatively, a fully independent committee could
bargains.
propose a slate of candidates for an up-or-down vote, thereby at least
preventing horse-trading of appointments on the floor of the General
Assembly. Raising the prerequisites for nomination, such as
education levels and years of judicial service, can ensure that whoever
132
is elected will be qualified. Unavoidable bargaining should at least
be more public, so that NGOs and the press can scrutinize deals and
domestic voters can hold their governments accountable for the
bargains they strike.
Domestic judiciaries have considerable experience with
reappointment and reelection. The need to run for reelection skews
judicial incentives and outcomes. For example, American state trial
judges often face popular reelection and are therefore likely to be
more punitive in sentencing, presumably in an effort to be seen as
133
tough on crime. Concerns abound that periodic elections undermine
134
judges’ independence and impartiality. As Alexander Hamilton
foresaw, “[p]eriodical appointments, however regulated, or by
whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their
135
necessary independence.” To solve this problem, international
courts should move from short, renewable terms toward a single,
longer term of service. The Rome Statute has appropriately moved in
this direction, providing that from now on the ICC’s judges and
131. Elections for ICTY judges do not use secret ballots. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art.
13bis (describing the procedure for judicial elections). The ICC improved on this model by
requiring the use of a secret ballot. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra
note 5, art. 36(6).
132. The ICC has taken an appropriate step in this direction, requiring that judicial
nominees be qualified to serve in the highest judicial office in their home states, have experience
in criminal law or international law, and have excellent knowledge of one of the court’s official
languages. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 36(3). More
explicit qualifications and strict enforcement would help.
133. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice
Blind when It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 261 (2004) (concluding that as judicial
elections approach, judges impose increasingly punitive sentences); cf. Richard A. Posner, What
Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 41 (1993) (suggesting that elected judges are more susceptible to political influence).
134. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995) (suggesting that the majoritarian difficulty associated
with elected judges may not be compatible with constitutional democracy); Joseph R. Grodin,
Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1979–83 (1988) (suggesting that judicial elections pose a threat to the
integrity of the courts).
135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Prosecutor will serve one nonrenewable nine-year term. Nine years
may suffice, or we may find that judges still cultivate relations with
patron governments to secure future jobs after their current ones end.
If that happens, even longer terms could turn international judicial
appointments from stepping stones to the capstone of a judge’s
career.
B. State Cooperation
International courts need states to cooperate with them. They
cannot search for evidence, compel witnesses, or arrest suspects
without the help of states, which are all too often uncooperative.
Some courts, such as Nuremberg, enjoyed good cooperation because
the Allied nations running the tribunal occupied and controlled the
137
remnants of the German state. But the ICTY and ICTR face much
more difficulty, even though international law obligates states to help
locate persons, take testimony, request evidence, serve documents,
138
and arrest suspects. Most notoriously, for thirteen years the ICTY
could not arrest the two masterminds of the Balkan war, Radovan
Karadžić or Ratko Mladić. For most of the thirteen years, Bosnian
authorities and even NATO troops knew where Karadžić was but
139
lacked the will to arrest him. Not until July 2008 did Serbian
authorities arrest him, under the threat of sanctions, promises of
140
financial aid, and a change in domestic government. Worse, Mladić
141
still remains at large, hiding in plain sight in Serbia. These delays

136. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, arts. 36(9)(a), 42(4).
137. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, supra
note 18, 82 U.N.T.S. at 294, art. 17 (enumerating the powers of the Tribunal). See generally
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (1993) (providing an overview
of international humanitarian law governing occupied territories).
138. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 29(2); id. ¶ 4. Decisions of the Security Council taken
under Chapter VII are binding on all UN member states. U.N. Charter art. 25.
139. See Carla Del Ponte, Hiding in Plain Sight, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, at A15 (“It is
clear that NATO and the authorities in Serbia and Montenegro know even more about
[Karadžić and Mladić’s] whereabouts . . . . The time has come to summon the will and bring
[them] to justice.”).
140. See Finally, Nowhere to Hide, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A20. Karadžić’s arrest was
motivated by economic threats from the United States and the European Union. See David
Rohde & Marc Lacey, Arrest Helps Tribunals Prosecuting War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2008, at A10.
141. Vesna Peric Zimonjic, The Most Wanted Man in Europe: Caught on Video: Ratko
Mladic, a Fugitive from Global Justice After Ordering the Worst Massacre in Modern Europe,
Enjoying Life in Serbia, INDEPENDENT (London), June 12, 2009, at 1 (describing film footage of
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and failures to arrest have slowed the work of the ICTY and called its
efficacy into question.
The ICC faces even more daunting challenges. Without state
assistance, the ICC is truly impotent, unable even to transfer an
142
accused already in custody in a foreign jurisdiction to the court. Its
statute binds only States Parties, yet even they often fail to fulfill their
obligations. The ICC steps in when national governments cannot or
will not prosecute, but these same states likewise often cannot or will
not assist the ICC. For example, the leadership of the Lord’s
Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group, remains at large despite
143
ICC arrest warrants issued in 2005. Though everyone knows that
the rebels are hiding in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
144
(DRC), the Congolese military cannot and will not arrest them.
Even more troubling, the UN Mission in the DRC could arrest them
145
but has shown little political will to do so.
Perhaps the most powerful example of the ICC’s need for state
cooperation is its efforts in Sudan. Initially, Sudan defied ICC arrest
warrants for two leaders of the Darfur genocide, including one sitting
minister of the Sudanese government, and threatened ICC staff and
146
witnesses. As a result, prosecutors must rely on witness interviews
Mladić enjoying living openly in a Belgrade suburb, allegedly as recently as 2008, though
Serbian officials insist the footage is much older).
142. When Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was arrested by Congolese authorities in Kinshasa, the
ICC lacked the means to physically transfer him to the Hague. Eventually, the French
government provided transport. See BBC News, Profile: DR Congo Militia Leader Thomas
Lubanga, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6131516.stm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
143. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Application for Warrants of Arrest Under Article 58 (July 8, 2005).
144. See Letter from Jane Kiggundu, Solicitor Gen., Gov’t of Uganda, to the Registrar, ICC
(Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-286-Anx2ENG.pdf.
145. See Scott Baldauf, Legacy of Rwanda’s Genocide: More Assertive International Justice,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 7, 2009, at 6 (discussing MONUC’s politically motivated
decision not to arrest Congolese rebels); MONUC, Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUC - Mandate, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/mandate.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2009) (explaining that the 2004 revision of the original mandate includes the new
responsibility to contribute to the disarmament of Congolese combatants). In early 2009, the
UN Mission in the DRC unsuccessfully attempted an arrest but has otherwise been reluctant to
act. See Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at A1.
146. See Maggie Farley, Warrants Issued in Darfur Conflict: U.N. Court Seeks the Arrests of
a State Official and a Militia Leader, but Sudan Appears Unlikely to Hand Them Over, L.A.
TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A3; Eric Reeves, Obama, Darfur, and ICC Justice, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 24, 2008, at 9; see also OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, SECOND REPORT OF
THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, MR. LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO,
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in neighboring countries’ refugee camps. When the ICC Prosecutor
so indicted Sudanese President Bashir, the African Union (AU) as
well as some leading NGOs and academics loudly criticized the court,
148
condemning its legitimacy and vilifying its Prosecutor. If key states
took the approach adopted by the AU, the ICC’s indictments and the
institution itself would be an empty threat. Cooperation, however, is
about far more than public rhetoric, and the AU’s statements may say
more about Sudan’s influence in the organization than the actual
willingness of states to assist the court. The real questions are whether
Western powers will pressure Sudan and its neighbors, whether key
African states will deny him entry and safe transit, whether domestic
audiences will force him from power as they did Milošević, and
whether he can be arrested while abroad. In at least some of those
149
respects, the court’s prospects appear more promising but remain
dependent on astute diplomacy and ongoing state cooperation.
Though international tribunals need state cooperation and
support, at the same time getting too close to any one nation would
call into question their independence and impartiality. When the ICC
Prosecutor opened his investigation in Uganda in 2004, he sought to
establish a close relationship with President Museveni to allow the

TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSC 1593,

at 4 (2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2CFC1123-B4DF-4FEB-BEF4-52E0CAC8AA79/0/LMO_UNSC_Report
B_En.pdf (noting a “climate of insecurity” and the “absence of an effective system of
protection” for victims and witnesses in Sudan).
147. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Statement to the U.N. Security
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.
int/NR/rdonlyres/4B0CCA58-55A5-4428-9886-9DE1DB5BB24F/0/LMQ20061216_en.pdf
(noting investigation difficulties due to the lack of Sudanese cooperation).
148. See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) (July
1–3, 2009) (condemning the indictment of Bashir); Jeffrey Gettleman, As Charges Loom, Sudan
Chief Mounts Charm Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2008, at A6 (discussing Sudan’s efforts to
persuade powerful states on the Security Council to block efforts to arrest Bashir); Neil
MacFarquhar, Accusations Against Leader of Sudan Fuel Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at
A15. Though not a State Party, Sudan is legally obligated to cooperate with the ICC by UN
Security Council Resolution 1593. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005);
see also Eric Posner, The Limits of Global Legalism, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, July 3, 2009,
http://volokh.com/posts/1246649185.shtml (noting a treaty obligation to arrest Sudan’s
president).
149. Bashir has, for example, failed to attend summit meetings in some African states due to
fear of arrest. See Uganda Says Sudan’s Bashir to Send Deputy over ICC, REUTERS, July 16,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLG94343 (noting that Sudan would send a
deputy to a summit in Uganda after Uganda indicated that it might act on the ICC arrest
warrant).
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150

smooth functioning of his investigation. Yet, the ICC Prosecutor’s
now-infamous handshake with Museveni, which signaled that the
court would not investigate potential crimes by government forces,
151
led many Ugandans to view the Prosecutor as Museveni’s puppet.
Hybrid tribunals face different problems. Because they are
rooted in a national judiciary, they depend on the host state’s
152
assistance and support. Although they can harness a domestic
government’s coercive capacity, they have difficulty securing evidence
153
from or arresting suspects in other states. Moreover, hybrids risk
being co-opted by domestic authorities. The Extraordinary Chambers
in Cambodia, for example, have been widely criticized as a pawn of
154
the Cambodian government. The balance between cooperation and
co-option is precarious.
Solutions to the state cooperation dilemma are more often
155
political than legal. Realistically, international tribunals will not
have their own police powers in the foreseeable future. There are,
however, four broad ways to mitigate the problems of state
cooperation. First, international tribunals should seek greater
cooperation from and deeper integration with clean-handed, helpful
states. The ICC must urge, prod, and cajole the 108 States Parties,
especially those that are not likely to be the site of an investigation, to

150. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 2 (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf (discussing
the need for close state cooperation).
151. For a discussion of the perception of bias generated by this meeting, see Zachary A.
Lomo, Why the International Criminal Court Must Withdraw Indictments Against the Top LRA
Leaders: A Legal Perspective, SUNDAY MONITOR (Kampala), Aug. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/press_releases/press_whyICCmustwithdraw.pdf.
152. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, art. 17, Jan. 16, 2002,
2178 U.N.T.S. 138, available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtAgreement
Final.pdf (providing for cooperation by the government).
153. The STL has difficulty investigating because Syria is uncooperative. See generally S.C.
Res. 1644, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1644 (Dec. 15, 2005) (condemning Syria for its lack of cooperation
with the ICC).
154. See Suzannah Linton, Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the
Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 327, 340 (2006).
155. Existing formal legal obligations to cooperate have proved insufficient to motivate
unwilling states. For example, Sudan faces an obligation under UN Security Council Resolution
1593 to “cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court.” S.C. Res.
1593, supra note 148, ¶ 2. Yet Sudan has failed to arrest any of the indictees on its territory.
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156

assist international tribunals. Though astute diplomacy is a good
157
first step, tribunals also need deeper integration into clean-handed
states’ domestic legal systems. Extradition could become as routine as
it is between American states, without the need to jump through
cumbersome treaty procedures. Likewise, courts need intelligencesharing arrangements, so that international authorities have access to
domestic wiretaps and other information. Working directly with
national enforcement officials would be faster, more efficient, and
less political than having to funnel requests through a political
158
bottleneck of a state’s foreign ministry. Cooperation agreements
could authorize international courts to requisition transport
assistance, collect evidence, or execute warrants through a national
159
judiciary, rather than through a state’s foreign ministry.
By
bypassing foreign ministries, international and domestic courts and
police could cooperate as smoothly as American state and federal
authorities do in arresting, extraditing, and sharing information.
Second, international tribunals should use issue linkages and
sanctions to pressure uncooperative states. Although international
tribunals themselves have few levers to coerce unwilling national
governments, third-party states and international organizations can
pressure uncooperative states by linking cooperation to trade
benefits, foreign aid, and sanctions. The 2008 arrest of Radovan
Karadžić, noted above, was motivated by the threat of European
160
Union sanctions and the promise of significant financial incentives.

156. For various statements by national governments in support of the ICC, see BurkeWhite, supra note 9, at 60 nn.23–28.
157. The Jurisdiction, Cooperation and Complementarity Division of the Office of the
Prosecutor is responsible for diplomacy. It needs to be more proactive and better solicit the
support of national governments. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Remarks
at the 27th Meeting of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (Mar. 18,
2004), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICCProsecutorCADHI18Mar04.pdf.
158. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 87 (providing
statutory authority for communication with States Parties and specifying the use of “the
diplomatic channel”); see also ICC R. P. & EVID. 176–77 (delineating responsibilities for
communications among organs of the court).
159. Many states would have to pass implementing legislation to allow international
tribunals to directly interface with and activate domestic institutions. Americans may see such
unlimited cooperation as far-fetched, but some European states, such as France, have amended
their constitutions to conform to the Rome Statute and could be convinced to provide deeper
cooperation. See generally Michael P. Hatchell, Note, Closing the Gaps in United States Law and
Implementing the Rome Statute: A Comparative Approach, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183
(2005) (discussing domestic implementation of the Rome Statute).
160. See Rohde & Lacey, supra note 140.
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Third, international tribunals should consider offering sentence
discounts and plea agreements in exchange for cooperation and selfsurrender to reduce their dependence on state cooperation. In this
vein, American criminal procedure already offers discounts to induce
defendants to turn themselves in, plead guilty, not file motions, and
cooperate. Sentence discounts for self-surrender could provide
incentive for indictees to submit themselves to the tribunal, without
the need to get state assistance to make arrests. Cooperative states
could also freeze assets automatically upon indictment, increasing the
pressure to surrender. Similarly, as Part IV.B discusses, cooperation
agreements could induce testimony, reducing the need for in-country
interviews or forensic evidence collection. Though far from ideal,
these discounts may be necessary to circumvent political roadblocks
to justice.
Finally, as a last resort, regime change may be the only available
way to deal with a state that systematically harbors international
fugitives. An indictment and arrest warrant from an international
tribunal may provide a rallying point around which victims and
opposition can unite to force an international criminal from power or
161
to pressure a government to turn over a suspect. Slobodan
Milošević, for example, was ultimately arrested after a domestic
162
uprising in Serbia toppled his regime.
The closest domestic
analogue is that officials who shelter criminal cronies risk electoral
163
defeat, impeachment, and even federal civil-rights prosecution.
C. Funding
International tribunals likewise depend on national governments
for their funding, either directly or through international
organizations, which raises two concerns. First, funding may be
164
inadequate. The ICC’s €66.8 million budget allocation for 2006 fell
161. These efforts must be undertaken carefully given the possibility of nationalist backlash.
For example, the ICC Prosecutor’s request for an indictment of the Sudanese president led to
rallies of support in Khartoum. See Lydia Polgreen & Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Rallies Behind
Leader Reviled Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2008, at A1.
162. See CHRIS STEPHEN, JUDGEMENT DAY: THE TRIAL OF SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ 145,
155–62 (2004).
163. Most famously, President Gerald Ford’s pardon of former President Richard Nixon is
thought to have doomed whatever hopes he had for reelection. Lionel Van Deerlin, Gerald
Ford: The Right President for His Time, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 9, 2001, at B7.
164. Although the ASP has been relatively generous thus far, that generosity may not
continue. See, e.g., ICC, Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the Work of Its Sixth
Session, ICC-ASP/05/01 (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/
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short of the court’s request and required the ICC to scale back certain
165
The ICTY and ICTR have likewise
programs and staffing.
experienced significant budget pressure as states have sought to
166
curtail their contributions to the UN. Funding constraints can limit a
tribunal’s staffing, prevent new investigations, or impair responses to
167
Hybrid tribunals face even greater
unforeseen developments.
operational constraints, as they depend on the support of poorer host
states and on voluntary contributions that richer states sometimes
168
promise but do not deliver. In 2008, the Cambodia tribunal began
169
pleading for additional funding so that it could begin its first trial.
Second, financial dependence can compromise independence
and impartiality. Funding often turns on the support of rich, powerful
states. When the ICTY Prosecutor decided not to investigate crimes
by NATO forces in Kosovo and Serbia, she might have feared that
such an investigation would jeopardize the U.S.’s and U.K.’s financial
support. The ICC Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate crimes by
170
British forces in Iraq raised the same question of independence.

library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-1_English.pdf. For information on presently available finances, see ICC,
Financial Statements for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2005, ICC-ASP/05/02 (Aug. 8,
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-2_English.pdf.
165. Jonathan O’Donohue, The 2005 Budget of the International Criminal Court:
Contingency, Insufficient Funding in Key Areas and the Recurring Question of the Independence
of the Prosecutor, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 591, 593 (2005).
166. ICTY and ICTR funding comes through assessed contributions to the UN, whereby
states are required to pay a portion of the UN budget. Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid
Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 347, 427 (2006). Because ICTY and ICTR expenses are more than 10 percent of the UN’s
annual budget, reductions in tribunal budgets can decrease assessed contributions. See David
Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 861, 861 (2006).
167. In 2009, for example, the ICC staff was limited to 744 persons with a budget of about
€100 million. Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Res. ICC-ASP/7/Res.4 (Nov. 21, 2008). That budget may preclude new investigations and
will be a factor in how ongoing investigations are conducted.
168. See Higonnet, supra note 166, at 427. Many of the pledges to the State Court of Bosnia
& Herzegovina have not been delivered. See COURT OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, PROJECT
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PROGRESS REPORT 35 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.
registrarbih.gov.ba/files/docs/WCC_Project_Plan_201004_complete.pdf.
169. See Paul Watson, Special Cambodian Court Short of Funds, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2008,
at A4.
170. See Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, to Senders of
Communications Regarding Iraq (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB774CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf (noting that
“the Statute requirements to seek authorization to initiate an investigation in the situation in
Iraq have not been satisfied”).
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Several innovations could better insulate international courts
from the political pressures of securing funding and the perceptions of
bias. First, international tribunals should develop standby reserve
171
funds to cushion them against real or threatened budget cuts.
Second, soliciting donations could provide a further buffer against
budgetary threats. Third, courts could forfeit and seize convicts’
funds, furthering financial independence. The Rome Statute already
allows the ICC to impose financial penalties on those convicted of
172
Presently, seized funds and fines are
international crimes.
173
earmarked for a trust fund for the benefit of victims and witnesses.
Many warlords have stashed away millions or billions from their
plunder, so courts could consider splitting proceeds among victims,
witnesses, and court systems. American experiences here suggest
174
proceeding with caution. There is a danger that prosecutors might
target the wealthy to enhance their budget, so rules need to insulate
case selection against this danger. Finally, international courts could
stretch their dollars by streamlining procedures along American lines.
For example, Parts IV.B and IV.C suggest, they could make greater
use of plea bargaining and cooperation discounts.
D. Defense Resources
The politics of funding has especially grave consequences
175
defense lawyering. Despite significant reforms, the ICTY legal
system discourages zealous litigation. Defense counsel receive
lump sums for pretrial, trial, and appeals work based on

for
aid
set
the

171. A variant of this approach has been used by hybrid tribunals, whereby establishment is
conditioned on an adequate “donors fund.” See COURT OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, supra
note 168, at 35.
172. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 77(2).
173. Id. art. 79.
174. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 56–82 (1998) (discussing how the prospect of
forfeiture warps law-enforcement incentives to prosecute drug crimes that are likely to result in
large forfeitures). For an overview of a recent procedural reform designed to protect innocent
owners against overzealous, financially motivated law enforcers, see generally Barry L. Johnson,
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 and the Prospects for Federal Sentencing Reform,
14 FED. SENT’G RPTR. 98 (2001).
175. See Secretary-General, Comprehensive Report on the Progress Made by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Reforming Its Legal Aid System,
¶¶ 7–39, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. DOC. A/58/288 (Aug. 12, 2003) (outlining
reforms in 2001 that sought to create incentives for defense counsel to work efficiently and
control costs). Initially, the ICTY paid defense counsel about one hundred euros per hour, with
a 175-hour monthly cap. Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
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176

complexity of the case. Because there is no extra compensation for
177
extra hours or dollars spent, this lump sum system discourages
spending much time or money on cases. Moreover, although holding
back partial payments until the end of a phase may speed up trial, it
also encourages defense counsel to underlitigate in their haste to
178
receive their fees.
Defense funding can be even more problematic for hybrid
tribunals, in which prosecutors are often much more influential than
legal aid offices. For example, in East Timor, the UN directly funded
the hybrid tribunal’s prosecutor, whereas the impoverished East
179
Timorese government funded the defense. As a result, during the
first two years of trials in East Timor, no defense counsel called a
180
single witness. More recently, the hybrid war crimes chamber in
Bosnia has paid defense only for hours in the courtroom, offering no
181
resources for investigation or pretrial work.
Ultimately, the
legitimacy of international criminal law depends on zealous defense.
That in turn requires compensation for full and effective—but not
dilatory—litigation and common budget constraints for the
prosecutor and the defense. Although many American defense
lawyers likewise suffer chronic funding problems, some enterprising
lawyers have succeeded in increasing defense resources by reframing
the debate. Domestic scholarship shows that phrasing the need for
defense resources in terms of leveling the playing field, rather than
182
helping defendants, can make proper funding more palatable.

176. See id. ¶¶ 24–25. For the simplest cases, the lump sum payments assume 1,400 lead
counsel hours; for the most difficult leadership cases, the lump sum payments assume 2,800 lead
counsel hours. See id. Annex I. Defense counsel receive $132,000 for simple trials expected to
take four months, or $400,000 for leadership trials expected to take ten months. See id. Annex
III.
177. The UN notes: “If a trial stage terminates ahead of schedule, the defence will still be
entitled to the full lump sum; conversely, if the trial runs a little longer, the defence will not
receive additional payments.” Id. ¶ 25.
178. This structure encourages defense counsel to litigate quickly but not thoroughly. See
generally Bibas, supra note 12, at 2476–78 (discussing how low lump sums or flat fees impair
defense lawyering and encourage haste).
179. See Burke-White, supra note 4, at 70.
180. See id.
181. See Burke-White, supra note 62, at 346 n.255.
182. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of
Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 261–62 (2004).
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IV. IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL CASE MANAGEMENT
Because international criminal justice has evolved so recently
and haphazardly, it has only begun to heed to systemic issues of case
management. The idealistic desire to do justice collides with the
reality of limited time and money. The system must learn to perform
better triage by screening out some cases and striking cooperation
agreements or other plea bargains in many more. Otherwise, the
hordes of lower-level cases will continue to delay or deny justice to
the likes of Slobodan Milošević. We consider in turn how to improve
gatekeeping and case selection, plea bargaining and caseloads, and
finally sentencing.
A. Gatekeeping and Case Selection
Though the universe of potential cases is nearly infinite,
international criminal tribunals can bring only a very few cases
themselves. But they find it hard to motivate domestic prosecutors to
pursue other cases, and critics often attack their decisions to take or
183
decline certain cases. Although statutes emphasize the need to
prosecute those most responsible, they lack clear criteria for ranking
184
cases. The lack of criteria not only calls into question particular
charging decisions but also delays important cases such as Milošević’s.

183. See William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion vs. Judicial Activism at the
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731, 736–48 (2008) (discussing criticisms of
ICC case selection). In its early years, the ICTY pursued low-level suspects, id. at 746, when it
desperately needed to bring any accused to fill empty courts. Unfortunately, the more recent
reliance on subsidiarity and culpability for gatekeeping has not been fully effective. The ICTY
still has pending indictments against twenty-five suspects and the ICC has at times failed to
follow its statutory limitation to the most serious offenders. Details of the remaining ICTY cases
in trial or awaiting trial are available at http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4. With a few
exceptions, such as Radovan Karadžić, most of these suspects probably would not qualify as
those most responsible for the atrocities in the Balkans. The first two indictees from the DRC
are far from those most responsible for international crimes there. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda,
ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest, 3–4 (Aug. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/041/06, Warrant of Arrest, 3–4 (Feb. 10, 2006).
184. The Rome Statute provides that a case must be “of sufficient gravity to justify further
action by the Court.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art.
17(1)(d). The Prosecutor has sought to clarify in a white paper the criteria for selecting cases,
but the paper has not been published and offers insufficient guidelines. See Office of the
Prosecutor, supra note 67. Recent scholarship has sought to develop the gravity criterion. See
Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., forthcoming
January 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270369.
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To solve these problems, the first step is to clarify the functions
and purposes of punishment. Part I.A discussed the need to target
atrocities and serve as a backstop to domestic judiciaries, and Part I.B
emphasized the goals of restoration, reconciliation, and retribution.
This Part addresses how to implement these priorities in practice and
draw on domestic lessons in doing so.
Domestic prosecutors have plenty of experience with screening
and gatekeeping. In particular, federal prosecutors choose to take
certain cases federally and leave most others for the states. For
example, many federal prosecutors’ offices have written declination
guidelines. Typically, these guidelines classify cases by crime type,
amount of money or drugs involved, criminal history, pattern of
185
crime, strength of proof, and alternatives to federal prosecution.
Some district attorneys’ offices assign seasoned prosecutors to a
specialized screening unit, which reviews and investigates incoming
cases and decides whether the case is serious enough and whether the
186
evidence is strong enough to justify the charges. Federal and state
law-enforcement agencies often work together on joint task forces,
pooling their resources and knowledge and directing cases to
187
appropriate courts.
To apply these lessons internationally, one must first
188
acknowledge resource constraints openly.
A system that
idealistically promises justice to everyone will disappoint most of
them. It must focus on the most intentional and flagrant crimes that
caused the gravest harm to the most victims and sowed the most
189
widespread grief and bitterness. Coherent screening policies can
pick a handful of strong cases involving the worst crimes, to maximize
185. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 29.
186. Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 61–64 (discussing the New Orleans District
Attorney’s office).
187. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1182–83 (1995) (describing the DEA’s
creation and funding of federal task forces incorporating state and local police).
188. In 2006, the ICC Prosecutor indicated a goal of opening four to six investigations by
2009. Michel De Smedt, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Statement at the Second Public Hearing
of the Office of the Prosecutor: Outlining the Prosecutorial Strategy (Sept. 25, 2006), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/
Network+with+Partners/Public+Hearings/Second+Public+Hearing/Session+1/Outlining+the+Pr
osecutorial+Strategy+_+Mr_+Michel+De+Smedt.htm. Only four investigations are presently
underway. ICC, Situations and Cases: All Situations, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
Situations+and+Cases/Situations/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
189. For a discussion of international criminal justice’s primary function of targeting
atrocities, see supra Part I.A.
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public satisfaction and historic resolution. They can screen out all but
the most serious international crimes and all but the highest-level
persons responsible, such as political or military leaders. These
criteria mesh with the backstop function of international law: national
leaders can prosecute their own lower-level criminals but may be
unable or unwilling to prosecute their own political and military
leaders.
The existence, efficacy, and limitations of national courts are
important considerations here. Domestic federal prosecutions, for
example, target deficiencies in state criminal justice. For example, the
Petite Policy authorizes federal reprosecution if some flaw tainted an
190
earlier state prosecution. Federal prosecutors may particularly
intervene in cases of public corruption, excessive force, and civilrights violations by police, for which local prosecutors and courts are
191
unlikely to clean house.
The backstop role means that international prosecutors must
assess the willingness and ability of domestic prosecutors and courts
to proceed. The ICC’s Rome Statute forbids international
192
prosecution if there is a “genuine domestic prosecution.” As a
result, prosecutors must gauge whether a domestic regime is
sheltering war criminals, dragging its feet in prosecuting them, or
pursuing them with vigor. More active domestic prosecutions can

190. 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2d ed. Supp. 2009)
(allowing evidence that corruption, incompetence, intimidation, or undue influence tainted a
prior state prosecution to overcome the presumption against federal reprosecution). Of course,
double jeopardy is not a constitutional bar to reprosecution by a different sovereign, Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132 (1959), but as a policy matter the Department of Justice steps in only
when state proceedings were deficient or inadequate.
191. For example, U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald succeeded remarkably in indicting two
sitting Illinois governors within five years. Fitzgerald was chosen precisely because, as an
outsider, he would be freer to clean up state and local corruption. See John Kass, U.S. Attorney’s
Independence Pays Dividends, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 2003, at C2 (“I think that having an
independent U.S. attorney out of reach of the normal power brokers who run Illinois is a major
and important change in our state.” (quoting Ill. Sen. Peter Fitzgerald (no relation), who
appointed Fitzgerald)). A different example is the Department of Justice’s reprosecution of
Rodney King’s attackers, four white Los Angeles police officers who had the venue of their
local trial changed to a mostly white suburb and were acquitted despite damning film capturing
their extended beating of King. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 85–88 (1996); Robert
Reinhold, U.S. Jury Indicts 4 Police Officers in King Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at A1.
192. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(a); see
also John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in 1 THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 65, at 667,
667 (“Ironically, however, the provisions of the Rome Statute itself contemplate an institution
that may never be employed.”).
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relieve the international caseload. International prosecutors and
courts should spur domestic enforcement, through what one of us has
193
dubbed proactive complementarity. Thus, if the ICC’s Prosecutor
can prod national courts to prosecute, he is barred from doing so, but
194
has achieved his ultimate goal of exposing and punishing atrocities.
In other words, international encouragement and prodding can
leverage scarce international resources, producing hundreds or
thousands of domestic prosecutions in lieu of dozens of international
ones.
When domestic courts are willing and able to prosecute, the ICC
has little need to proceed. When domestic prosecutors or courts are
unwilling or reluctant, international courts can spur them to act. For
example, they can shame national courts into action by focusing
media attention on a case. They can begin their own investigations or
send letters informing national governments that, if national courts
195
remain passive, they intend to prosecute internationally. Many
nations want to be perceived well and fear the embarrassment and
intrusion upon sovereignty of having an international court intervene.
Those nations may find it less politically costly to prosecute the
wrongdoers themselves.
When domestic prosecutors and courts are willing but not fully
capable, international courts can help to develop their capacity.
Although international courts are not designed to build domestic
judiciaries, they sit at the center of transnational networks and can
196
bring publicity, diplomacy, and investigative resources to bear.
Other organizations, such as the European Union, can help to build
and strengthen domestic judiciaries so that they can hear atrocity
197
cases. A more direct way to assist weak domestic courts would be to

193. See Burke-White, supra note 9, at 53–64 (developing the concept of proactive
complementarity).
194. See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 84, at 2 (“As a consequence of complementarity, the
number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary,
the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national
institutions, would be a major success.”).
195. The ICC Prosecutor followed this approach by writing to the government of Colombia
seeking information on the lack of domestic prosecutions. See Burke-White, supra note 9, at 89–
90.
196. See id. at 95–96; Turner, supra note 7, at 1007.
197. The European Union has provided significant funding and resources to DRC courts
after the initiation of the ICC investigation in 2004. See William W. Burke-White,
Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-
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use their greater resources to investigate and prepare cases at the
international level and then hand off prepared dossiers to domestic
198
prosecutors for prosecution.
Another possible way to shrink the international docket is to
apply the referral back mechanism more broadly. Having found itself
overburdened, the ICTY has referred many lower-level cases in
which it had already issued indictments back to national courts for
199
domestic prosecution. If the domestic judiciaries do not prosecute
these cases to the satisfaction of the international prosecutor,
however, the ICTY reserves the right to recall the cases to the
200
international level. The ICC does something similar, abstaining
from international prosecution when there is a genuine national
201
prosecution. International courts could use this referral back
mechanism not only reactively to reduce unforeseen backlogs, but
proactively to cooperate with, stimulate, and guide domestic
judiciaries. They could plan to farm out certain classes of cases to
willing, competent courts in affected or other nations and retain
202
oversight and checks to make sure these prosecutions were genuine.
International double jeopardy law resembles domestic policy, which
allows reprosecution of state cases tainted by “incompetence,
corruption, intimidation, or undue influence . . . [or] court or jury
203
nullification in clear disregard of the evidence or the law.” But so
long as the domestic prosecution is genuine, the international court
will not intervene. International referrals could help guide domestic
Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557, 571
n.76 (2005).
198. This proposal would institutionalize an aspect of the ICTY’s referral back mechanism
under rule 11bis whereby cases were handed back to national prosecutors in Bosnia. See ICTY
R. P. & EVID. 11bis. The ICTY sent back prepared dossiers to national prosecutors to facilitate
domestic prosecutions. See Burke-White, supra note 62, at 340–41. To make this practice work,
one would need to amend the Rome Statute’s rules regarding confidentiality of information,
and defense lawyers might need assistance to ensure equality of arms.
199. See Burke-White, supra note 62, at 321–28.
200. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 11bis(f) (providing for recall of cases).
201. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 17.
202. As this Article has discussed, see supra note 192 and accompanying text, international
courts are generally barred from investigating if the territorial court is willing and able to
prosecute domestically. Sometimes, however, a formerly unwilling nation becomes willing to
prosecute after a new government comes into power, in which case an international court could
then refer some cases back for domestic prosecution.
203. 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 190, § 9-2.031(D).
Compare id. (setting forth criteria for reprosecution quoted above), with Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 20 (barring reprosecution where domestic
prosecution was genuine).
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prosecutorial strategy and fill the impunity gap of lower-level cases
that international tribunals cannot prosecute. The threat of revoking
international referrals can help to keep domestic prosecutions on
track and leverage limited international resources. Overall, managing
cases well, especially by ranking priorities and allocating cases to
different courts, can make the international justice system more
effective for more cases.
B. Plea Bargaining and Caseloads
Another important conflict between idealism and realism is in
the field of plea bargaining. Ideally, international courts would hold
full public trials of all grave atrocities, or at least whenever national
courts cannot or will not do so. But the number of blood-stained
killers far exceeds the number of international trial slots. Often,
domestic courts are not an option, as many cases arise out of failed or
complicit states. Thus, international and hybrid courts face hard
choices: Do they try to offer perfect justice for everyone with
elaborate due process and crawl at a snail’s pace, as the ICTY did
with Milošević? Do they take at best a dozen cases a year and leave
thousands of others unpunished? Or do they dirty their hands,
haggling over the price of murder and trading off public vindication
for lesser punishment and quick plea bargains?
International courts have unthinkingly chosen the first of these
options—the impossible quest for perfect, widespread justice. The
average ICTR and ICTY trial spans almost a year and a half, costs
millions, hears hundreds of witnesses, and fills more than ten
204
thousand transcript pages. These trials have grown far more bloated
than their equivalents at Nuremberg. But, as the Milošević example
shows, the best is the enemy of the good. Because the ICTY tried too
hard to dispense retail justice to everyone, it failed to dispense justice
to perhaps the most culpable man of all.
The second choice would be more defensible. By even more
rigorously screening out all but a handful of top defendants,
international prosecutors could at least set part of the historical
record straight, offer some healing, and inflict public retribution on
warlords and dictators. One could combine this approach with
streamlined pretrial and trial procedures, so international courts

204. NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 28 (2007).
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could try one or two dozen defendants a year. On this approach,
though, international courts would have little credible leverage to
prod reluctant domestic courts into action.
Also, to reach the head of a criminal organization, domestic
prosecutors normally must start at the bottom and work up. They
start with drug pushers whom eyewitnesses saw peddling heroin, use
threats of punishments and promises of leniency to get them to testify
against their suppliers, and work up the chain to drug lords. In other
words, at least some plea bargaining with smaller fry is essential to
shatter the conspiracy of silence that surrounds the big fish, the ones
who most deserve punishment. International prosecutors could use
the same approach to prosecute otherwise insulated defendants, by
beginning cases with soldiers and working up the chain of command
205
to generals and warlords. Though international prosecutors must
focus on prosecuting those most responsible, charging and bargaining
206
away lower-level cases may facilitate prosecuting those higher up.
Moreover, as Nancy Combs argues, prosecution of violent crime
is the traditional norm in domestic law, and plea bargaining is a more
lenient innovation. International atrocities, in contrast, traditionally
went unpunished; even today, international courts can try only a tiny
207
handful. One alternative, a truth and reconciliation commission
such as South Africa’s, gives complete immunity in exchange for
airing the truth. Given those alternatives, plea bargaining looks less
like lenient innovation than improved accountability. If only a
handful of defendants are tried and punished, they may appear to be
205. International prosecutors do occasionally bargain for information and cooperation,
though neither systematically nor effectively. See id. at 108–10 (describing two botched efforts
to procure the cooperation of ICTR defendants: in one case, the defendant disappeared and was
found dead after references to his cooperation became public, while in the other case, Rwanda
blocked a proposed effort to move the cooperating defendant’s trial to Norway, where the
sentence would likely be lighter); Trial Watch: Michel Bagaragaza, http://www.trial-ch.org/
en/trial-watch/profile/db/legal-procedures/michel_bagaragaza_378.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2009) (reporting that after efforts to transfer the trial to Norway and the Netherlands failed, a
cooperating defendant was transferred back to Tanzania and entered a confidential plea
agreement).
206. If international and domestic systems were integrated enough, international authorities
could prod domestic ones to investigate and prosecute lower-level defendants to generate
evidence for eventual international prosecutions. The closest parallel to this approach is the
cooperation between U.S. state and federal law-enforcement agencies, in which task forces
cooperate to develop evidence and prosecute in either venue. See, e.g., JAN CHAIKEN ET AL.,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES:
REDUCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 43–47 (1990) (discussing case studies of cooperative efforts
between state and federal law enforcement).
207. COMBS, supra note 204, at 129–32.
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tokens, scapegoats, martyrs, or fall guys. Broadening the net of
conviction and retribution would share blame, substitute for private
208
vengeance, and elicit more complete historical narratives. Done
correctly, more frequent plea bargaining can both restore war-torn
communities by airing painful truths and inflict a measure of
retribution on many more defendants.
For years, international courts piously proclaimed that they
would never trade leniency, not even in exchange for much-needed
209
cooperation. But they then lurched in the other direction. Prodded
by staggering backlogs, international courts have begun to plea
bargain more in the last few years, drawing criticism from European
210
scholars. Unfortunately, they have not always gone about it in the
right way. As Ronald Wright and Marc Miller argue, trials are most
honest and transparent, followed by open guilty pleas without
bargains. But if one must bargain, the best plea bargains are sentence
bargains, which offer sentence discounts without distorting the facts
or the charges. Charge bargains are much worse, because lowering
the charges often distorts the historical record and lies to the public
about what actually happened. Fact bargains likewise conceal or
211
blatantly lie about what happened. Charge and fact bargains are
even more troubling in the international arena because they undercut
restoration and setting the historical record straight. Yet international
courts have quickly succumbed to charge bargains, many of which
appear to suppress, distort, or misrepresent the historical record. For
example, ICTY prosecutors dropped a charge that Milan Simić had
discriminatorily persecuted thousands of Bosnian civilians in
exchange for his pleading guilty to torturing five victims, even though
212
Simić refused to cooperate against other defendants. It would be far

208. Id. at 46–47, 53–55.
209. See id. at 60 (citing the declaration of a former ICTY president that “no one should be
immune from prosecution for [certain crimes], no matter how useful their testimony may
otherwise be”).
210. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, supra note 8, at 1074–80 (considering the tradeoffs in plea
bargaining); Alan Tieger & Milbert Shin, Plea Agreements in the ICTY: Purpose, Effects and
Propriety, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 666, 669–79 (2005) (criticizing aspects of ICTY plea
bargaining).
211. Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 111.
212. In 2002, the ICTY began charge bargaining in the Simić case. COMBS, supra note 204,
at 63–65. Several later ICTY cases contain troubling indications of charge bargaining, though it
is often difficult to be sure why a prosecutor dropped particular charges. Id. at 67–70. Likewise,
ICTY prosecutors have begun to bargain more aggressively over whether particular defendants
committed genocide or lesser crimes. Id. at 111–12.
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better to bring bargaining out into the open, explicitly authorizing
sentence bargaining and clamping down on charge and fact
bargaining. For example, international tribunals should delete
provisions that allow prosecutors to strike bargains agreeing to
amend indictments, and at guilty-plea colloquies should insist on
213
proof of guilt independent of the parties’ collusive agreement.
Not all cases are appropriate for plea bargaining. The most
important international defendants are the ringleaders—the top
political and military officials who orchestrated atrocities. It is far
more important to try and punish the likes of Adolf Hitler, Hermann
Goering, Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Slobodan Milošević, and Radovan
Karadžić than their low- and mid-level minions. Plea bargaining with
low- and mid-level killers clears dockets and procures testimony so
that the system can punish and set the record straight more
effectively, especially at the top. Thus, international courts should ban
plea bargaining and insist on open trials for the very top leaders, the
ones at the center of the historical record and blame.
If guilty pleas are to substitute for trials’ truth-telling function in
some cases, they must also include full, detailed plea allocutions.
Victims who wish to do so must be able to see and hear their
tormenters confess unequivocally, without denial, excuse,
minimization, or blaming victims. Unequivocal, detailed confessions
would thwart future atrocity deniers and propagandists. Sentence
discounts should not be automatic for perfunctory, bare-bones
admissions of guilt, as happens all too often in domestic American
214
guilty pleas.
Another useful approach is to join guilty pleas to restorative
justice. Restorative justice is an umbrella term for structured
opportunities for wrongdoers, victims, mediators, and often friends
and relatives to talk with and listen to one another. Many victims
want not only retribution, but also information, reparation, and, when
possible, apologies. They value opportunities to tell their stories,

213. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 62bis(iv) (allowing an agreement between parties to be a
sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea); id. 62ter(A)(i) (allowing prosecutors to agree to amend
indictments as part of plea bargains).
214. See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”:
The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1534–40 (1997) (reporting the results of an empirical study
of one federal district in which acceptance-of-responsibility reduction operated as a nearly
automatic plea discount in practice and reviewing national evidence that 88 percent of
defendants who plead guilty, but only 20 percent of those who go to trial, receive the discount).
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express their feelings, and perhaps forgive and release their
resentment, anger, and grief. Involvement empowers victims and
takes their needs and views seriously. Restorative justice efforts can
tap into a local society’s traditions and culture, helping to bring justice
215
home for victims. Many wrongdoers bear the weight of guilt and
shame and want to cleanse themselves or perhaps even ask for
forgiveness. Granted, other victims and defendants are reluctant to
take part, and confessions and apologies can be absent, halting, or
insincere. But when the parties are willing, this kind of storytelling
gives everyone access to a form of justice and increases satisfaction, as
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission shows.
Restorative justice is not a substitute for retribution for atrocities, but
216
it may supplement guilty pleas when the parties are willing.
In sum, increasing the use of plea bargaining, managing cases
better, and offering restorative justice can shrink dockets, increase
accountability, and make the remaining international trials more
effective.
C. Sentencing
Sentencing and plea-bargaining rules must work in tandem. To
encourage guilty pleas, there must be incentives to plead guilty, to
participate in restorative justice, and to testify and provide
information against other defendants. Instead of charge reductions,
prosecutors need to be able to offer explicit sentence discounts. True,
this proposal commodifies justice and apologies, which in an ideal
217
world would be priceless. But we do not live in an ideal world, and
we desperately need truth and justice to halt the cycle of vengeance in
war-torn lands. As one of us has argued, even a purchased, insincere
apology is valuable: it vindicates the victim, humbles the wrongdoer,

215. Restorative justice is a nascent, growing movement in countries including Australia,
New Zealand, and Canada, as well as various American states. For a survey of the field, see
generally Symposium, The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1. The
proposed peace settlement in Uganda seeks to harness this approach; it would try the senior
rebels domestically and have them participate in restorative justice processes as well. See
Annexure to Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Lord’s Resistance
Army/Movement-Uganda, Feb. 19, 2008, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
Annexure_to_agreement_on_Accountability_signed_today.pdf.
216. For an extended argument for integrating restorative justice into international plea
bargaining, see COMBS, supra note 204, at 136–87.
217. For a powerful statement of this position in the context of civil lawsuits, see Lee Taft,
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1156–57 (2000).
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affirms the violated norm, and may even induce repentance by
218
cracking the wrongdoer’s denials and excuses.
Probably the least offensive way to encourage guilty pleas is to
offer relatively fixed sentence discounts in exchange for complete,
truthful pleas. Sentencing rules could prescribe these discounts
automatically in exchange for open guilty pleas, without any need for
bargaining. Alternatively, prosecutors could recommend sentence
discounts according to a fixed schedule, provided that judges followed
a settled practice of usually heeding prosecutors’ recommendations.
A guilty plea with a full, truthful allocution could earn a one-fifth
219
discount, for example. A guilty plea coupled with full participation
220
in restorative justice might earn a one-third discount. And a guilty
plea coupled with restorative justice and full cooperation with the
221
authorities against other defendants might earn a one-half discount.
(If courts need more leverage to encourage the fullest cooperation,
discounts could range from one-third to one-half depending on the
degree of cooperation.) This approach would avoid the dishonesty
inherent in charge and fact bargains and would minimize unseemly,
unequal haggling dependent on the quality of one’s lawyer. Fixed
discounts can be difficult to enforce domestically, where prosecutors
have a wealth of different charges and sentencing factors that they

218. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 143–44 (2004).
219. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2538 & n.331 (collecting commentators advocating fixed
plea discounts of between 10 percent and 20 percent, as well as literature suggesting that
defendants’ high discount rates would require discounts toward the upper end of this range for
sentences of ten years or more).
220. Cf. CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE arts. 442, 444.1 (Italy) (providing for a one-third
sentence reduction for a guilty plea to a minor charge provided the reduced sentence does not
exceed five years, and a one-third sentence reduction for agreeing to an abbreviated trial of
certain serious charges); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 28 (1988) (discussing the
Sentencing Commission’s empirical data that, before the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were
created, guilty pleas typically received sentence discounts of 30 percent to 40 percent); Julie R.
O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 1342, 1415 (1997) (reporting that under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, guilty pleas
typically earn acceptance-of-responsibility discounts of about 35 percent).
221. Cf. LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT
FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 33 ex. 12 (1998) (reporting that average sentence reductions
for defendants belonging to certain demographic groups who successfully cooperated with
federal authorities ranged between 54 percent and 66 percent below the otherwise applicable
Sentencing Guidelines minimum).
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222

can manipulate. But the problem should be more manageable
internationally, as the range of possible charges is far narrower and
the widely publicized facts are harder to hide or distort.
International courts also need to integrate their cooperation
rewards with domestic systems. Because the same defendant can face
charges or have information relevant to international, hybrid, and
domestic trials, one level of court may need to grant leniency in
exchange for cooperation at another level. For example, domestic
courts could offer soldiers plea discounts in exchange for their
testifying against their commanding officers in international trials. In
these cases, courts need mechanisms to delay sentencing until other
defendants’ proceedings end or to reopen sentencing if a need for
cooperation arises later. Also, cooperating witnesses may refuse to
make incriminating statements unless they receive use or derivativeuse immunity against having those statements introduced into
evidence against them domestically or internationally. International
and national courts may need to harmonize their immunity
223
guarantees to encourage cooperators to disclose the whole truth.
Although there are no international sentencing guidelines, there
have been some efforts to move toward common sentencing
224
practices. Should each international tribunal try to equalize its
sentences with those imposed by other international tribunals, or
rather with domestic sentences in the country where the crime was
committed? Sentences vary widely, particularly between Africa
(where many international crimes occur) and Western Europe (whose
nations often take leadership roles in international courts), so the
225
choice of law matters. In the American federal system, it makes
sense to harmonize federal sentences horizontally for crimes
prosecuted almost exclusively at the federal level, such as
226
immigration, counterfeiting, and federal income tax evasion.
Federal laws, policies, and interests are written to apply uniformly

222. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2535–37.
223. The ICC could integrate this harmonization into the existing cooperation agreements
the court signs with many States Parties.
224. E.g., Daniel B. Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal
Court, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 127–28 (1997).
225. Cf. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (discussing how criminal justice is
milder in Europe than it is in the United States).
226. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 137, 140 (2005).

BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL

692

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM

[Vol. 59:637

across a single legal system. But for crimes that either level can
prosecute, such as robberies and gun cases, there is more need to
harmonize sentences vertically, so the fortuity of federalizing some
227
cases does not change sentences much.
If international law focused on transnational crimes, such as
piracy, the case for horizontal uniformity would be strong. Because
international law instead targets atrocities and serves as a backstop,
international prosecutions necessarily overlap with domestic ones.
Domestic courts often try cases that could be handled internationally.
In the ICTY, for example, Bosnian courts receive cases back from
international tribunals but ultimately apply their own domestic
228
sentencing rules. Similar issues relating to vertical uniformity arise
when domestic courts prosecute atrocities under domestic law. The
lines between genocide and mass murder or between systematic rape
and serial rape are at least fuzzy, and domestic crimes are lesser
included offenses of international ones. Thus, it is more important for
international sentences to track domestic ones in the territorial state
(at least roughly) than to track the sentences of other international
tribunals.
International tribunals appear to be moving away from vertical
sentencing harmonization, in part because Western Europeans favor
lighter sentences and oppose the death penalty, which remains on the
229
books in many countries where international crimes occur. Though
the ICTY Statute called on the Tribunal to take into consideration
domestic sentencing rules in the former Yugoslavia, the Rome Statute
does not require the ICC to give similar consideration to national
230
sentencing practices in the territorial state. To foster vertical
227. See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The
Center Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1402–06 (2008).
228. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. X-KRŽ-05/70, slip op. at 13–15 (Court of
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Section I, War Crimes Chamber, Mar. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/presude/2007/Radovan_Stankovic_-_Final_Verdict_-_ENG.
pdf (lengthening prison terms and applying domestic legal rules).
229. See generally WHITMAN, supra note 225 (comparing the harshness of criminal
sentences in the United States and European countries). Vertical uniformity was problematic in
Cambodia, where disagreement over the availability of the death penalty stalled the
establishment of the tribunal. For the resolution by the Constitutional Council, see
Constitutional Council, Case No. 038/001/2001, Decision No. 040/002/2001 (Feb. 12, 2001).
230. Compare Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)I, Annex, Art. 24(1), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)
(“In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the
general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.”), and ICTY
R. P. & EVID. 101(b)(iii) (same), with Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra
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sentencing harmonization, the ICC could consider domestic practice
in the territorial state as an explicit element at sentencing. The result
would likely be longer sentences for most convicts but greater
harmonization with domestic practice.
Finally, there remains the issue of whether to codify sentencing
rules in structured guidelines or to leave them as open, unstructured
ranges. Traditional, unstructured sentencing lets judges sentence
murderers to probation, life imprisonment, or anywhere in between.
Structured sentencing sets a much narrower range based on factors
such as the defendant’s criminal history and role in the crime, the
severity of the crime, and the number of victims. If they seek vertical
uniformity, international tribunals cannot use rules radically different
from those in place in the territorial state of the crime. Nevertheless,
even when tracking nations that have vague sentencing factors,
international courts can at least clarify and weigh the factors openly.
Sentencing rules of thumb or true guidelines can improve the
predictability and equality of sentences and reduce defendants’
optimism about their likely sentences after trial, thereby promoting
231
guilty pleas and cooperation. Thus, sentencing guidelines should
make sentencing practices clearer and more predictable, specify pleabargaining and cooperation discounts, and harmonize international
sentences with those imposed in territorial domestic courts.
V. PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES
The new international criminal justice system comprises
elements from many nations’ systems, both adversarial and
inquisitorial. In this Part, we first make a broader point: either
adversarial or inquisitorial procedures can be effective, but each
system requires certain checks that the other system often lacks.
Unfortunately, in synthesizing the two systems, international courts
have often lost sight of cautionary domestic experiences with the two
types of systems. Then, we go on to apply domestic lessons to several
areas of pretrial and trial procedure. Discovery rules should focus less
on prosecutorial awareness and wrongdoing and more on whether
evidence may cast doubt on guilt. At the same time, discovery of
inculpatory evidence needs to be coupled with safeguards to prevent
witness tampering. Trial procedures need to ensure speedier trials
note 5, art. 78 (providing guidelines for the “[d]etermination of the sentence” but failing to refer
to not including reference to domestic law).
231. Bibas, supra note 12, at 2533.
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and guarantee either neutral magistrates or adversarial crossexamination to test hearsay. Finally, to heal victims’ emotional and
psychic wounds, international criminal justice needs stronger and
better-enforced victims’ rights.
A. Melding Adversarial and Inquisitorial Process
International criminal tribunals have developed a unique
procedural system that melds inquisitorial and adversarial
232
processes. Nuremberg, and later the ICTY and ICTR, began as
233
Although the ICTY’s largely
primarily adversarial systems.
adversarial system went far to ensure defendant rights, it also resulted
234
in long trials with hundreds of witnesses and unacceptable delays.
To expedite trials, the ICTY undertook a series of reforms that
235
moved further toward inquisitorial justice. The result is a hybrid
236
international criminal procedure.

232. See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure
in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 842 (2000) (“Like the London Charter, the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals’ statutes and rules combine aspects of the common law, civil
law, and military law.”); Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due
Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 640 (2007) (noting that
international tribunals “are forced to compromise internally regarding procedural
matters . . . [and] must harmonize the imperatives of . . . the common law and the civil law”).
233. Gordon, supra note 232, at 644 (noting some inquisitorial elements at Nuremberg,
including the use of affidavit testimony); Langer, supra note 8, at 857 (“Those judges drafted
[the ICTY and ICTR] Rules with a clear adversarial inclination.”); Evan J. Wallach, The
Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials: Did They
Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 851, 854
(1999).
234. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President, ICTY, Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committee in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 13, delivered to the Security
Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc S/1999/846, A/54/187 (Aug. 25, 1999) (“The
Tribunal’s Judges are concerned about the length of time many of the trials and other
proceedings are taking . . . .”).
235. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 369 (2003) (“[T]o expedite
proceedings which, being grounded in the adversarial model, were rather lengthy, it was
necessary to depart from the common law scheme . . . . whereby the court has no knowledge of
the case before commencement of trial.”); Langer, supra note 8, at 869–874; Jorda, supra note
67, at 1.
236. Wallach, supra note 233, at 854. Langer calls this “managerial judging.” See generally
Langer, supra note 8 (discussing the rise of managerial judging at the ICTY). The new ICC rules
of procedure and evidence are based largely on this model. See Nancy Amoury Combs,
International Criminal Jurisprudence Comes of Age: The Substance and Procedure of an
Emerging Discipline, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 555, 566 (2001) (reviewing SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF
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Fundamentally, adversarial and inquisitorial systems specify very
different roles for judges, prosecutors, and even defendants.
Adversarial judges are detached umpires, with prosecutors and
defense counsel serving as zealous investigators and advocates for
their clients. In contrast, inquisitorial judges and investigating
magistrates are active truth-seekers, collecting and reviewing
237
evidence to determine facts.
Our argument is not that a pure adversarial or inquisitorial
system is preferable. Our fear is that the mishmash of the two systems
has abandoned some distinctive checks on which each system
depends. The lack of appropriate mental models for the role of
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel results in confusion and
perhaps even systemic failure. For example, when an American
defense attorney dared to object repeatedly to the ICTY Prosecutor’s
evidence, the judges found his adversarial advocacy inappropriate
and rejected his procedural objections. The French presiding judge
criticized him for trying to import “the procedures that Mr. Hayman
238
is used to using in Los Angeles.” If the system is going to be
adversarial, American experience suggests, it needs to allow zealous
adversarial testing of the evidence instead of censuring American
lawyers for playing their roles. If, however, the system is going to be
inquisitorial at root, it needs to retain more inquisitorial safeguards.
Additionally, the mishmash of systems obscures how to allocate
resources. Because an adversarial system is based on two relatively
equal parties contesting facts and evidence, each side needs roughly
equal, adequate resources in order to investigate. American
experience teaches that in an adversarial system, parity of funding for
239
the two sides is crucial. But when inquisitorial judges carry the
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia SwaakGoldman eds., 1990)).
237. See Langer, supra note 8, at 849–53; Vladimir Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Cultures
in the International Criminal Court: The Experience from the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 627, 630 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the different legal
cultures in international criminal tribunals). Adversarial and inquisitorial systems are two poles
along a spectrum. Today, most continental European judges and scholars describe their system
as mixed rather than purely inquisitorial, in part because nineteenth- and twentieth-century
reforms borrowed some safeguards from adversarial systems. David Alan Sklansky, AntiInquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1640 (2009).
238. See Kitty Felde, ‘L.A. Law’ at a War Tribunal: Clash of Legal Systems, Styles,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 3, 1997, at 7.
239. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 182; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-293(h) (2005)
(mandating salary parity for prosecutors and public defenders); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150,
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burden of investigating for both sides, the parties need fewer
resources and the judges need more resources.
B. Discovery
The legacy of the adversarial system is that each opposing party
investigates and presents evidence favorable to its own side, with no
judicial oversight. One of the worst features of the adversary system,
especially in America, is that it allows each party to prepare, shape,
and even coach its own witnesses to elicit favorable facts and suppress
unfavorable ones. Inquisitorial systems, in contrast, have judges and
police who question witnesses. Though advocates may suggest certain
witnesses or certain subjects for questioning, in an inquisitorial
240
system, they may not speak directly with most witnesses.
In this respect, international criminal procedures combine the
worst of both adversarial and inquisitorial worlds. They spell out no
evidentiary, ethical, or procedural limitations on witness preparation,
241
allowing partisan adversaries to distort the truth. At the same time,
they provide for very broad discovery. Well ahead of trial,
prosecutors must turn over prior statements of all witnesses the
prosecutor plans to call at trial, and thereafter defense lawyers must
242
make similar disclosures. Full pretrial discovery has many merits,
eliminating trial by surprise and facilitating preparation. But in
inquisitorial systems, judges and police interview witnesses well

1161 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (using prosecutors’ salaries as a benchmark for setting defense
lawyers’ salaries).
240. William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37, 42–44, 58–59 (1996)
(reporting that Germany, like most civil law countries, strongly prefers uncoached narrative
testimony, and views American-style witness preparation as unethical; instead, prosecutors and
defense and victims’ lawyers suggest additional witnesses for police to interview, leaving the
questioning of those witnesses to police and judges).
241. Witness preparation has been accepted by the ICTY and ICTR since their inception.
See e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution
Practice of ‘Proofing’ Witnesses, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2004) (rejecting a challenge to the Prosecutor’s
preparation of witnesses). The ICTR dismissed the possibility that witness preparation would
distort the truth, noting: “There are clear standards of professional conduct which apply to
Prosecuting counsel when proofing witnesses.” Id. at 3; see also Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case
No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶ 14
(May 11, 2007) (approving the use of witness preparation at the ICTR); Ruben Karemaker, B.
Don Taylor & Thomas W. Pittman, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A
Critical Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 683, 685–86 (2008)
(detailing the practice of witness proofing).
242. ICC R. P. & EVID. 76.1; ICTY R. P. & EVID. 66(A)(ii).
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before trial, and their transcripts are admissible into evidence.
Because neither witness tampering nor intimidation can erase the
witness’s story, full discovery is much less dangerous. When one
prosecutes genocidal warlords in an adversarial system, however, full
discovery creates far too much temptation to kill or silence the
complaining witnesses and to tailor one’s story to the evidence
revealed in discovery. Full, open-file discovery in New Jersey has
proved deadly to witnesses, tempting defendants’ associates to kill
244
them to keep them from testifying. Discovery is desirable, but it
must be coupled with inquisitorial measures to preserve and admit
245
witness testimony, and to thwart witness tampering. The ICC has
recently taken an important step in this direction, breaking with
earlier international tribunals by forbidding witness preparation.
Now, only the Victim and Witness Unit—not the Prosecutor—may
246
familiarize witnesses with the proceedings and with past statements.
The fragmentation of authority poses another problem for
discovery. Prosecutors must turn over to the defense evidence that
could exculpate or mitigate the defendant’s crime or impeach the
prosecution’s evidence. This duty extends only to information that the
247
prosecutor actually knows about and possesses or controls. The
fragmentation of investigative and enforcement authority across
different states and international organizations, however, means that
the prosecutor may not actually know about or control evidence in a
243. Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 343
(1995) (noting that, under German law, the admissibility of police transcripts, though not
judicial transcripts, depends upon the witness’s being unavailable).
244. See David Kocieniewski, Scared Silent: In Witness Killing, Prosecutors Point to a
Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at A1 (detailing the murder of a key witness in a drug case).
245. While courts are supposed to protect victims and witnesses and withhold discovery as
necessary to do so, that protection undercuts the rule of full disclosure and so is limited to
exceptional cases. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 68,
¶ 5 (limiting disclosure in cases of “grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her
family”); ICC R. P. & EVID. 81.3, 87–88; ICTY R. P. & EVID. 69(a) (authorizing nondisclosure of
the witness’s or victim’s identity “[i]n exceptional circumstances” where that person “may be in
danger or at risk”). Thus, prosecutors may well disclose evidence that leads to witness
intimidation or tampering.
246. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Regarding the
Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ¶¶ 53–55
(Nov. 30, 2007); Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, at 21–22 (Nov. 8, 2006) (barring the
Prosecutor from conducting evidentiary review with the witness).
247. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 68; Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the
Production of Discovery Materials, ¶¶ 47, 50 (Jan. 27, 1997).
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state’s hands. For example, only days after the ICTY convicted a
Bosnian Croat general of atrocities, Croatia turned over thousands of
pages of potentially exculpatory evidence, leading the Appeals
248
Chamber to overturn sixteen of his nineteen convictions. (The
potential for delay and manipulation of the judicial system is
obvious.) Similar problems arise in the United States’ fragmented
federal system. Courts charge American prosecutors with a
constitutional duty to inquire of investigators from the same
jurisdiction, holding them liable for what they knew or should have
249
known. Unfortunately, this standard focuses on the prosecutor’s
knowledge and actions, not on the defendant’s innocence. At the very
least, international prosecutors should face the same standard,
bearing a burden to investigate what they should know instead of
hiding behind lack of actual knowledge. Better cooperation between
states and law-enforcement agencies could also make more
information from various states available to prosecutors. Ideally, the
cautionary lesson of America’s flawed approach would lead
international courts to adopt a tougher standard. At least for
powerfully exculpatory evidence, the standard should focus not on
the prosecutor’s actus reus or mens rea but on whether the evidence
creates a strong doubt about guilt. The focus should be not on
punishing prosecutors for violating the rules of an adversarial game
250
but on freeing defendants who are likely innocent.
A related problem that arises in discovery is that nations
sometimes share information with international prosecutors on
condition that they not disclose the information. These nondisclosure
provisions collide with defendants’ need to know, investigate, and
rebut the evidence against them. If the material is inculpatory, of
course, the prosecution cannot use it without getting the supplier’s
251
consent and providing it to the defendant in advance of trial. But if
the withheld material is exculpatory, a state’s refusal to share
information could lead to convicting the innocent. In the ICC case of
Thomas Lubanga, for example, the Prosecutor had received possibly

248. Gordon, supra note 232, at 678–79.
249. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995); Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136,
1142 (Pa. 2001).
250. For a more extended development of this idea, see Stephanos Bibas, Brady v.
Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 151–54 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
251. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 54, ¶ 3(e); ICC R.
P. & EVID. 82.1; ICTY R. P. & EVID. 70(B).
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exculpatory evidence under a confidentiality agreement and withheld
252
it from the defense. To solve this problem, prosecutors should have
to submit confidential exculpatory or impeachment evidence to the
court for in camera review; the court could then dismiss charges or
overturn convictions if the evidence creates a reasonable doubt about
guilt. Domestic prosecutors already do this with information that may
253
or may not qualify as exculpatory. Confidentiality agreements that
preclude even in camera review by courts raise even more serious
issues. Prosecutors should reject these restrictive agreements, even
though that may limit their access to both inculpatory and
254
exculpatory evidence.
C. Trial Procedures
International trial procedures also could learn from domestic
guarantees of speedy trials and cross-examination. One important
development would be to add teeth to speedy-trial requirements.
Defendants, many of whom are detained without bail, can languish in
jail for years awaiting justice although they are presumed innocent.
Victims and the public likewise have strong interests in seeing justice
done quickly so they can begin to heal. The ICTY and Rome Statutes
guarantee defendants speedy trials. Yet, in practice, courts uphold
255
years-long delays. Though recent procedural reforms have tried to
256
speed trials, there is still much room to improve. Before trial, judges
need to enforce strict schedules and use plea bargaining to clear their
dockets for the most important trials. At trial, judges need to exercise
their powers to limit the number of witnesses and the length of their
252. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal of
the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I, ¶¶ 21, 57 (Oct. 21, 2008).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 562 F.3d 947, 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(remanding the case to the district court to conduct in camera review of possibly exculpatory or
impeachment evidence in the presentence investigation reports); United States v. Naranjo, 309
F. App’x 859, 865–66 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing the district court’s in camera review of witnessinterview notes for exculpatory and impeachment material).
254. See Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of
Trial Chamber I, ¶ 45 (expressing particular concern about a prosecutor’s agreement to accept
large amounts of information from the UN subject to an agreement not to disclose that
information even to the court).
255. E.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 10, 270–71
(Dec. 18, 2003) (holding that a delay of three years and eight months between arrest and
conviction was not disproportionate); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, supra note 5, art. 67, ¶ 1(c) (requiring cases “[t]o be tried without undue delay”); S.C.
Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 21, ¶ 4(c).
256. Langer, supra note 8, at 886.
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257

testimony. The Nuremberg trials began less than seven months after
the Allies’ victory in Europe; within a year, they had convicted or
acquitted all twenty-two defendants and executed those sentenced to
258
death. True, most states now accord defendants somewhat more
procedural rights than they did sixty years ago. Nevertheless, fairness
and justice should be measured in months, not years.
Another important issue is the admissibility of written
statements. As mentioned, inquisitorial systems charge judges and
police with investigating even-handedly and make their transcripts
admissible, at least when witnesses are unavailable. Adversarial
systems, in contrast, do not trust pretrial investigations conducted by
partisan advocates. Instead, all witness evidence must be live
testimony at trial, so that the other side can cross-examine it to probe
its weaknesses. International criminal justice lacks neutral
investigating magistrates, whose pretrial questioning one could trust
to be even-handed. Though it lacks this inquisitorial safeguard, it also
dispenses with the adversarial requirement of cross-examination in all
cases. ICC and ICTY rules allow the parties to submit documentary
evidence and written statements, not subject to cross-examination, on
259
peripheral issues other than “the acts and conduct of the accused.”
It makes sense to admit uncontested hearsay on background matters
such as the existence of a war in the Balkans or the demographics of
an area’s inhabitants. As long as the other side has adequate notice
and a right to rebut, these measures can speed trials past uncontested
jurisdictional elements and peripheral issues. Unfortunately, in their
efforts to speed and streamline trials, these courts have gone too far.
They have admitted testimony of witnesses from prior trials against
260
other defendants to prove a current defendant’s mens rea. Neither
inquisitorial, even-handed questioning nor adversarial cross-

257. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 73bis(C).
258. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NÜRNBERG CASE, at viii, xii–xiii (1947).
259. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 92bis; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
supra note 5, art. 69, ¶ 2 (allowing the introduction of recorded testimony, documents, and
written transcripts so long as they do not prejudice defendants’ rights).
260. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Concerning Rule 92bis(C), ¶ 11 (June 7, 2002) (allowing un-cross-examined evidence “of the
knowledge by the accused that his acts fitted into a pattern of widespread or systematic attacks
directed against a civilian population”); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8, Trial Chamber
Decision on Prosecutor’s Application to Admit Transcripts Under Rule 92bis, ¶¶ 11, 21, 2001
WL 1794081 (May 23, 2001) (allowing admission of evidence that could be used to prove the
defendant’s guilt of genocide, and suggesting that the remedy was to call new evidence rather
than to permit cross-examination).
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examination has probed the weaknesses of evidence so central to the
prosecution’s case. Each side needs to be able to insist on live
testimony that it can cross-examine, except when it has previously
cross-examined the same witness at a deposition or perhaps when the
witness has died.
D. Victims’ Rights
A final concern is that international procedure is not sensitive
enough to victims’ needs and concerns. If the main purpose of
international justice is to restore wounded communities and heal
victims, then victims need to feel that the system takes them seriously,
listens to them, and gives them opportunities to release their anguish,
bitterness, and grief. All too often, international law’s technicalities
and the physical distance of Hague-based trials from victims
exacerbate victims’ disconnection from proceedings and outcomes.
To be fair, international procedures evince some solicitude for
victims. The ICTY and ICC have victim-witness offices to counsel and
261
protect victims’ privacy and safety, and also facilitate reparations
262
and compensation. But the ICTY’s procedures guarantee victims no
notice or consultation about bail, guilty pleas, trial, or sentencing. The
263
ICC goes further. It allows victims to hire legal representatives, who
may, if the court permits, make opening and closing statements and
264
question witnesses. It requires notifying victims of decisions not to
investigate or prosecute or to confirm charges. Those who apply to
the court to participate through legal representatives are notified of
later proceedings and discovery, and the court may choose to solicit
265
their views on other matters. Early ICC decisions suggest that the
court will interpret “victims” broadly and grant them considerable
266
influence.
If domestic practice is any indication, however, the grand
rhetoric of victim participation outstrips reality. In practice, despite
261. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 34, 65(B)–(C), (I)(ii), 69, 75; ICC R. P. & EVID. 16–19, 85–88.
262. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 106; ICC R. P. & EVID. 94–99.
263. See David Donat-Cattin, Article 68 Protection of the Victims and Witnesses and Their
Participation in the Proceedings, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 869, 871 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
264. ICC R. P. & EVID. 89–91.
265. Id. 92–93.
266. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on Victims’
Participation, ¶ 92 (Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc409168.
pdf (defining victims before the court and setting the scope of victim participation).
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broad victims’ rights laws, many crime victims fail to receive notice.
Although they are better than nothing, a legal representative’s
motions and questions are no substitutes for the victim’s own day in
268
court. At the very least, victims should be able to watch proceedings
on television. Ideally, they should have some opportunity to speak or
at least submit their stories in writing. Of course, victim participation
is in tension with keeping trials short and swift, particularly because
genocides harm hundreds or thousands of victims. But there are ways
to incorporate American victims’-rights experiments into
international justice without bogging down the system. Perhaps
victims could submit video victim-impact statements at sentencing.
Integrating international criminal trials with local restorative justice
efforts would let more victims take part by telling their stories to
defendants in restorative-justice conferences afterwards, without
compromising the speed of trials. Simply giving victims these
cathartic, expressive opportunities would take them seriously and
help them to heal. Plea and sentencing procedures could push for and
reward unequivocal admissions of guilt, remorse, and even
269
apologies. Unequivocal admissions of guilt vindicate victims, open
the door to forgiveness, and set the historical record straight,
precluding Holocaust denials. Conversely, judges and prosecutors
should refuse to accept guilty plea allocutions that deny or minimize
270
defendants’ acts or guilt or shift blame onto victims. Judges and
prosecutors could even speak in less technical and more moralistic
language at pleas and sentencing, clearly documenting and
condemning atrocities for all to see.

267. JOHN M. BOYLE, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS/E. REG’L CONFERENCE, CRIME ISSUES
NORTHEAST 3 (1999), available at http://www.csgeast.org/pdfs/cv.project.report.pdf
(providing statistics that show a lack of notice); DEAN G. KILPATRICK, DAVID BEATTY &
SUSAN S. HOWLEY, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS—DOES LEGAL PROTECTION MAKE A
DIFFERENCE? 4–5 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief, NCH 173839, 1998), available at
http://ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173839.pdf.
268. See William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 735 (2003) (discussing the
cathartic effects of live testimony for rape victims from Bosnia).
269. For more extended explorations of these points, see Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note
218, at 140–45.
270. See Bibas, Harmonizing, supra note 75, at 1400–08 (discussing the harmful effects of
“[g]uilty-but-not-guilty pleas”).
IN THE
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CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the lessons that domestic criminal
procedure can teach international procedure, in particular how
domestic realism can temper international idealism. The numerous
lessons range from case management to staffing, from budget
allocations to procedural safeguards. As international criminal courts
come of age and confront ever-growing caseloads, these domestic
lessons can obviate reinventing the wheel, enhance efficiency, and
make international criminal justice more just.
Although we have focused on the lessons domestic criminal
procedure can offer international criminal law, the comparison works
the other way around as well. Domestic procedure has grown so
cynical and amoral that it could profit from a dose of fresh
international idealism. The lessons of international criminal law for
domestic procedure merit a separate article, but we introduce three
key themes here.
First is the theme of transparency and political accountability.
Domestic criminal procedure is opaque. Except for a few high-profile
cases, there is little public scrutiny of charging and prosecuting
271
decisions, leaving plenty of room for the agency costs of self272
interested lawyers. Plea bargaining behind closed doors resolves the
vast majority of cases. In contrast, international tribunals are
transparent and accountable. Every decision and transcript is posted
for all to see. The prosecutor and presiding judge must report twice a
year to the UN or the ASP and depend on state cooperation. NGOs
and scholars dissect a tribunal’s every move. Although the resulting
pressure can be problematic, it also makes the international system
accountable. For example, when the ICC Prosecutor charged
Lubanga only with conscripting child soldiers, the NGO community
cried foul that other crimes—particularly rape and sex crimes—were
273
neglected, forcing the Prosecutor to broaden his strategy. Granted,
international criminal justice is easier to monitor: there are fewer
271. See Bibas, Transparency, supra note 75, at 923–31 (discussing the exclusion of outsiders
from the process).
272. See id. at 920–23 (discussing the interests of insiders).
273. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, Int’l Crisis Group, Statement at the Second Public Hearing of
the Office of the Prosecutor (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/9BF30137-776A-457D-B2CE-BF1DB8F4D25E/277910/OTP_PH2_HGSTATES.pdf
(“Human rights organizations have criticized the limited scope of the charges laid – limited to
conscripting children - claiming that evidence exists of systematic rapes, torture, and summary
executions.”).

BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL

704

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM

[Vol. 59:637

cases, they are much more serious, and they are highly salient,
exciting public and media attention. Nevertheless, perhaps NGOs and
reporting requirements could introduce more domestic transparency,
making domestic criminal justice more accountable.
Second is the goal of restoration. As we have discussed, the
global context and atrocity focus make restorative justice particularly
salient internationally. Victim participation, outreach to affected
communities, and the linkage of formal trials and traditional justice
mechanisms promise to enhance restoration. In contrast, domestic
criminal law has largely neglected this restorative element, focusing
instead on retribution and incapacitation. Though contexts differ,
domestic criminal law could do more to emphasize restoration. For
low-level domestic crimes, judicial processes could use informal social
pressure and shame and seek to heal as much as punish. For more
serious crimes, particularly hate and bias crimes, domestic law could
involve victims more directly and supplement criminal trials with
truth commissions or other restorative processes.
Finally, although we have criticized overzealous idealism, its
flipside—cynicism—is equally dangerous. Domestic prosecutors,
judges, and defense lawyers are far too often cynical, jaded veterans
274
who have lost their vision and motivation. International officials
and NGOs, in contrast, are driven by strong idealism. We might even
try to leaven domestic cynicism with a dose of international idealism.
Perhaps more term limits, rotation in office, and rhetoric about justice
can combat the world-weary cynicism that wears down zealous
newcomers. A system less like a plea-bargaining assembly line and
275
more like a morality play could better inspire the actors. Greater
transparency and accountability might also motivate even cynical
veterans to play their roles with gusto.

274. See Bibas, supra note 82, at 1009–10 (“[P]rosecutors may eventually become wedded to
convicting defendants and less careful about presuming innocence and questioning evidence of
guilt. They may develop a black-and-white view of the world and fail to see shades of gray.”).
275. See Bibas, Transparency, supra note 75, at 960 (suggesting that abandoning the
“assembly-line system” could enable citizen advocates “to serve as effective voices”).

